

AM 1931 fur
E. H. Ferguson

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

A CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF
THE ETHICS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL.

by

Earl Hubert Furgeson
(A.B., Depauw, 1928)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

1931

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIBRARY

Sex.

p 6885

58885

upstairs
378.744
B0
A.M. 1931
fur

outline.

Chapter I: Practical Ethics.

	<u>Pages.</u>
I. Unselfish motives	1-4.
A. persecution during the War	2
B. unjust Criticism	2
II. High ideals	4-41
A. Education	4-7
B. politics	7-15
1. The State	9
2. Anarchism	10-13
3. Guild Socialism	13-15
C. Marriage and love	15-35
1. place of Fear in traditional morals	18
2. Sex license and the good life	19-21
3. The liberation of love.	21
a). Childless unions	22
b). Marriage	23-35
(I). Significance for children	24
(II). Significance for parents	26-28
(a). The mother	26
(b). The father	27
(III). Extra-marital relations	28-35
(a). minimized by experimentation	28
(b). Temporary fancies	31
(c). Deep attachments	32-35
4. Superficial criticisms at this point	35-38

Outline

Chapter I: General Introduction

1-11	I. General Introduction
2	A. Presentation during the war
3	B. Unjust Criticism
4-11	II. High Ideals
4-7	A. Education
7-10	B. Politics
9	1. The State
10-12	2. Anarchism
12-14	3. Child Control
14-16	C. Marriage and Love
16	1. Place of Love in traditional morals
16-21	2. Sex license and the good life
21	3. The liberation of love
22	a) Ethical union
23-24	b) Marriage
24	(I). Significance for children
24-26	(II). Significance for parents
26	(a). The mother
27	(b). The father
28-29	(III). Extra-marital relations
29	(a). Justified by exasperation
31	(b). Temporary families
32-33	(c). Love affairs
33-35	4. General ethical attitude at this point

outline (continued)

a). Senator Bruce	35-37
b). Dr. Logan Clandening	37
c). Mrs. Walter D. Warrick	37
d). Summary	38
D. Ideals of personal happiness	39-41
III. Summary of chapter	41

Chapter II:

Practical Ethics Without a parent.

I. The philosophical basis of Mr. Russell's ethics	42-48
A. His philosophical position	42-48
1. philosophy as generalized science	42
2. metaphysical causality	43
3. ultimate reality	44
4. mind	44
5. The Self	46
a). Confusion at this point	47
b). Elimination of "I"	48
II. Surreptitious use of the concept Self	49-52
A. In the discussion of mind	49
B. In his ethical writings	50
1. Happiness as a purposeful, selective achievement	50-52
III. Confusion in his "hedonistic" ethic	52-55
IV. Ethical subjectivity	55-59
A. A change from his earlier position	56
B. Destructive consequences for practical ethics	57
C. This subjectivity transcended in practice	59
V. Conclusion and summary	60-61

35-37 a). General Introduction

37 b). Mr. Logan's Introduction

37 c). Mrs. Walter D. Wierlock

38 d). Summary

38-41 e). Details of personal happiness

41 III. Summary of chapter

Chapter II:

Practical Ethics Without a Premise

42-48 I. The philosophical basis of Mr. Russell's ethics

42-48 A. His philosophical position

42 I. Philosophy as generalized ethics

42 II. Philosophical necessity

42 III. Philosophical reality

42 IV. Philosophical idealism

42 V. The Self

42 a). Definition at this point

42 b). Definition of "I"

42-48 II. Correspondence and the concept Self

42 A. In the discussion of kind

42 B. In his ethical writings

42-48 I. Happiness as a purposeful, selective achievement

42-48 III. Conclusion in his "Moralistic" ethics

42-48 IV. Ethical subjectivity

42 A. A change from his earlier position

42 B. Descriptive consequences for practical ethics

42 C. This subjectivity presented in practice

42 D. Conclusion and summary

Chapter I.

practical Ethics.

Mr. Russell is one of the most intriguing of contemporary writers. His style is lucid, his motive zealous, and his argument clever. To the uninitiated he speaks with authority. To the careful thinker he is a provoking problem. It is the problematic aspect of Mr. Russell which will engage us in this paper.

Our thesis in regard to Mr. Russell is as follows: His practical ethics is commendable and well defended but is rendered invalid philosophically on three counts; first, it employs a point of view inconsistent with his philosophy; second, it goes beyond the bounds set by his theoretical ethics because, third, the consequence of his theoretical ethics is ethical subjectivity. We turn directly to a summary and analysis of his practical ethics leaving the criticism for the second chapter.

In his practical idealism Mr. Russell has left little to be desired. His motives are unselfish, his idealism is high, and his enthusiasm is untiring. These points need some elaboration.

That Mr. Russell's motives are unselfish is evidenced by the fact that he has endured a great amount of criticism and even persecution for his ideals. This has been especially true

Chapter I.

Practical Ethics.

Mr. Russell is one of the most intriguing of contemporary writers. His style is lucid, his motive reasons, and his argument clever. To the uninitiated he speaks with authority. To the careful thinker he is a provoking problem. It is the problematic aspect of Mr. Russell which will engage us in this paper.

Our thesis in regard to Mr. Russell is as follows: His practical ethics is commendable and well defended but is rendered invalid philosophically on three counts; first, it employs a point of view inconsistent with his philosophy; second, it goes beyond the bounds set by his theoretical ethics because, third, the consequences of his theoretical ethics is ethical subjectivity. We turn directly to a summary and analysis of his practical ethics leaving the criticism for the second chapter.

In his practical idealism Mr. Russell has left little to be desired. His motives are unselfish, his idealism is high, and his enthusiasm is untiring. These points need more elaboration.

That Mr. Russell's motives are unselfish is evidenced by the fact that he has endured a great amount of criticism and even persecution for his ideals. This has been especially true

of his activities in the interest of peace, and individual liberty. During the war he took up the defense of a group of conscientious objectors who had been abused by the government. One, a teacher, was sentenced to two years hard labor for refusing to be coerced into military service. Mr. Russell wrote a pamphlet exposing these abuses and as a result suffered rather severe curtailment of his liberties. He had been engaged to lecture at Harvard in 1917 and it was rumored that he might succeed Josiah Royce, but Harvard authorities were notified by the British ambassador at Washington that Mr. Russell would not arrive. His passports had been refused. Furthermore he was not allowed to visit Scotland, Liverpool, or the English coast towns. He was dismissed from the faculty of Trinity College and forbidden to continue his lectures on Mathematical logic in Cambridge. Finally he was fined \$500.¹

This is probably the most outstanding instance of what he has been willing to endure for the sake of what he believes to be just and right. In addition he has been severely and unjustly criticised for his theories, not only in morality, but also in philosophy, by those who would answer him by making him appear to be ridiculous. A most amusing example of

1. "The Bertrand Russell Case," Independent, Jan. 8, 1917.

of his activities in the interest of peace, and individual liberty. During the war he took on the defense of a group of conscientious objectors who had been abused by the Government. One, a teacher, was sentenced to two years hard labor for refusing to be coerced into military service. Mr. Russell wrote a pamphlet exposing these abuses and as a result suffered rather severe criticism of his liberalism. He had been engaged to lecture at Harvard in 1917 and it was rumored that he might suggest Jewish Boyce, but Harvard authorities were notified by the British ambassador at Washington that Mr. Russell would not arrive. His passport had been refused. Furthermore he was not allowed to visit Scotland, Liverpool, or the English coast towns. He was dismissed from the faculty of Trinity College and forbidden to continue his lectures on mathematical logic in Cambridge. Finally he was fined \$500.¹

This is probably the most outstanding instance of what he has been willing to endure for the sake of what he believes to be just and right. In addition he has been severely and unjustly criticized for his theories, not only in morality, but also in philosophy, by those who would answer him by making him appear to be ridiculous. A most amusing example of

1. "The Bertrand Russell Case," Independent, Jan. 8, 1917.

this is the controversy which waged in the Nation after the publication of his book, our knowledge of the External World. The reviewer for the Nation treats it as follows: "In this volume...Mr. Russell definitely reveals his call to preach the gospel to the heathen; the gospel being the new mathematical knowledge, the heathen being the psychologists, who are not half bad, the physicists, who are lacking in imagination, and the philosophers who are both hopeless and dishonest."¹ He suggests that Mr. Russell has received his knowledge of Berkeley "from the man in the street," and concludes: "Either Mr. Russell is unfathomably deep or he is, after all, astonishingly naive and uninformed. Our conclusion is that he is not unfathomably deep."²

The comments and the spirit of this review were sufficiently reckless to cause Prof. Chandler of Ohio State University and Prof. Perry of Harvard to come to the defense of Mr. Russell's reputation. Prof. Perry pointed out in an article in the same magazine³ that the review was "positively misleading," and that Mr. Russell was not, as implied, a "crude amateur" but one who was "respected by opponents and followers alike," being held in high regard by "Santayana, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce."

1. "Organum Novissimum." Nation, Jan. 21, 1915.

2. Ibid.

3. "The Philosophy of Mr. Russell." Nation, Feb., 18, 1915.

this is the controversy which waged in the Nation after the publication of his book, Our Knowledge of the External World.

The reviewer for the Nation treats it as follows, "In this volume... Mr. Russell definitely reveals his call to preach the Gospel to the heathen; the Gospel being the new mathematical knowledge, the heathen being the psychologists, who are not half bad, the physicists, who are lacking in imagination, and the philosophers who are both hopeless and dishonest." ¹ He

suggests that Mr. Russell has received his knowledge of Berkeley "from the man in the street," and concludes; "Either Mr. Russell is unethereally deep or he is, after all, astonishingly naive and unimpaired. Our conclusion is that he is not unethereally deep." ²

The comments and the spirit of this review were sufficient-

ly reckless to cause Prof. Chandler of Ohio State University and Prof. Perry of Harvard to come to the defense of Mr. Russell's reputation. Prof. Perry pointed out in an article in the same magazine that the review was "positively misleading," and that Mr. Russell was not, as implied, a "crude and-
"but one who was "respected by opponents and followers alike," being held in high regard by "Gantakans, Bradleys, Bonapartes, and Ropes."

1. "The Philosophy of Mr. Russell," Nation, Jan. 21, 1918.
2. Ibid.
3. "The Philosophy of Mr. Russell," Nation, Dec. 18, 1918.

These are not, as we shall see later, the only instances of ridiculous criticism to which Mr. Russell has been subjected. Of course, everyone ⁱⁿ a public position is due for a certain amount of such treatment but Mr. Russell seems to get it in quantities heaped up and running over, the reason doubtless being that he holds views which are at variance with so many different groups, property owners, the state, religionists, moralists, and philosophers. The significant thing to be drawn from these conflicts is the fact that Mr. Russell is willing to submit to this abuse in the interest of what he holds to be true rather than to pursue a more cautious course. This may be taken as evidence of the fact that his motives are unselfish.

* * * * *

The task of showing that his ideals are above reproach is a more difficult matter, though I think this can be done. Not all will agree that his ideals will work out in practice as he intends them to but if it can be shown that in insisting upon these ideals he has the best interests of man at heart we may let pass as a human fallibility the fact that he may be mistaken. This task will engage us for the present.

Let us turn first to his educational ideals.¹ Mr. Russell's reform in education would start with a change in the

1. Based on Education and the Good Life, Ch. 2.

attitude of the system toward the child. "The teacher should love his children better than his State ^{or} his Church; otherwise he is not an ideal teacher."¹ He holds that pupils "should be regarded as ends, not as means."¹ "Neither character nor intelligence will develop as well or as freely where the teacher is deficient in love; and love of this kind consists essentially in feeling the child as an end."²

In addition to having this feeling of love for the student, the teacher must have some idea of excellence for the student. He recommends an excellence made up of four characteristics, Vitality, Courage, Sensitiveness, and intelligence.³ By Vitality is meant physical vigor. By Courage is meant first, the absence of irrational fear, which it is possible to eliminate by education⁴ and second, self-respect combined with an impersonal outlook on life. The impersonal outlook on life can be achieved by cultivating those things which take us beyond ourselves, namely, love knowledge, and art. A third constituent in excellence is sensitiveness, by which is meant "the quality of being affected pleasurably or the reverse by many things, and by the right things," the "right things" being social approbation and sympathy. One should feel sympathy "even when the sufferer is not an object of special affection" and "when the suffering is merely

1. Education and the Good Life, p. 57.

2. Ibid. p. 58.

3. Ibid. p. 60.

4. Ibid. p. 66.

known to be occurring (though, not sensibly present."¹ The fourth constituent of excellence is intelligence, the instinctive basis of which is curiosity. Curiosity ought to be "associated with a certain technique for the acquisition of knowledge,"² rather than stifled by "the desire to instil what are regarded as correct beliefs."³ "Open-mindedness should therefore be one of the qualities that education aims at producing."⁴ He would have this open-mindedness be fearless and virile, and would find at this point a place where courage could be applied with more value than most of the places where it is now applied, such as heroism in war. "Courage is essential to intellectual probity, as well as to physical heroism. The real world is more unknown than we like to think;....All sorts of intellectual systems--Christianity, Socialism, patriotism, etc.--are ready, like orphan asylums, to give safety in return for servitude. A free mental life cannot be as warm and comfortable and sociable as a life enveloped in a creed; only a creed can give the feeling of a cosy fireside while the winter storms are raging without."

These are the ideas which lie at the bottom of his reform in education. They are characterized by a return to the root meaning of the word "education"--a "leading out" of native aptitudes, this being done with absolute reverence for the individual

1. Education and the Good Life, p. 71.

2. Ibid. p. 78.

3. Ibid. p. 74.

4. Ibid. p. 77.

known to be occurring (though, not necessarily present).¹ The fourth consistent of excellence is intelligence, the instance-five basis of which is curiosity. Curiosity ought to be "associated with a certain technique for the acquisition of knowledge,"² rather than stifled by "the desire to finally what are regarded as correct beliefs."³ "Open-mindedness should therefore be one of the qualities that education aims at producing."⁴ He would have this open-mindedness be fearless and virile, and would find at this point a place where courage could be acquired with more value than most of the places where it is now acquired, such as heroism in war. "Courage is essential to intellectual productivity, as well as to physical heroism. The real world is more unknown than we like to think;... All sorts of intellectual systems--Christianity, Socialism, patriotism, etc.--are ready, like orphan armies, to give safety in return for sacrifices. A free mental life cannot be as warm and comfortable and sociable as a life enveloped in a creed; only a creed can give the feeling of a cozy fireside while the winter storms are raging without." These are the ideas which lie at the bottom of his reform in education. They are characterized by a return to the root meaning of the word "education"--a "leading out" of native aptitudes, this being done with absolute reverence for the individual.

1. Education and the Good Life, p. 71.
 2. Ibid., p. 75.
 3. Ibid., p. 74.
 4. Ibid., p. 77.

student. He protests bitterly that "it is not in the spirit of reverence that education is conducted by the states and churches and the great institutions that are subservient to them. What is considered in education is hardly ever the boy or the girl, the young man or woman, but almost always in some form, the maintenance of the existing order....Almost all education aims at strengthening some group, national or religious or even social, in competition with other groups. It is this motive, in the main, which determines the subjects taught, the knowledge which is offered and the knowledge which is withheld. It is this motive also which determines the mental habits that the pupils are expected to acquire. Hardly anything is done to foster inward growth of the mind and spirit; in fact, those who have had most education are very often atrophied in their mental and spiritual life, devoid of impulse, and possessing only certain mechanical aptitudes which take the place of living thought."¹ From this we gather that the central idea in education, from his point of view, is reverence for the individual student.

Our second investigation of his practical ethics lies in the direction of his political ideals. Mr. Russell is as much at variance with the existing order in politics as in education,

1. "Bertrand Russell's plea For the Child as the Vital Factor in Modern Education." Current Opinion, July, 1916.

and in the same direction, namely, that the good of the individual is overlooked. "political ideals must be based upon ideals for the individual life. The aim of politics should be to make the lives of individuals as good as possible....The problem of politics is to adjust the relations of human beings in such a way that each severally may have as much of good in his existence as possible."¹

Mr. Russell notes two kinds of goods; those of individual possession such as property, and the goods of a mental and spiritual sort, such as science and art. The former can belong to one man at the expense of others but the latter are increased in common as individuals possess them. Correspondingly there are two kinds of impulses; (1) Possessive, which aim at acquiring private goods which cannot be shared, and (2) Creative, which aim at bringing into the world the kind of goods in which there is no privacy. "The best life is one in which the creative impulses play the largest part and the possessive impulses the smallest."² Emphasis on the latter leads to "competition, envy, domination, cruelty, and almost all the evils that infest the world. In particular it leads to the predatory use of force. Material possessions can be taken away by force and enjoyed by the robber. Spiritual possessions cannot be taken in this way."³

1. Russell. "political ideals," N. American Rev. Feb. 1917.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

When this distinction is once grasped the individual will be aware that the goods which can be taken by force will be worthless and he will be moved by a spirit of reverence for others rather than by a desire to lord it over them. "They will treat every human being with a kind of tenderness, because the principle of good in him is at once fragile and infinitely precious....In one word, all their dealings with others will be inspired by a deep impulse of reverence."¹

Another consequence of realizing the superior place of the creative over the possessive impulses is the fostering of self respect in the individual. He will not only be moved by a spirit of reverence for others but also by "respect for the fundamental impulse in himself."²

If the things above noted are what we desire in the individual lives of persons, then we may judge political institutions by whether first, they encourage creativeness rather than possessiveness; second, they preserve self respect.

Applying these tests to modern political institutions Mr. Russell finds a vast discrepancy. "Our institutions at present rest on two things: property and power. Both of these are very unjustly distributed."³ This emphasis stifles creativity and forces conformity. As a cure for the situation he makes two

1. Russell, "political ideals," N. American Rev. Feb. 1917.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

suggestions: (1) that the government of every organization be rendered democratic ; (2) that self-government for subordinate groups be increased, whether these groups be geographical, economic, or defined by some common belief like religious sects."¹

These are the ideals which lie at the bottom of his reforms in politics. They are elaborated in his books, Why Men Fight, and proposed Roads to Freedom. In the former he considers the essential functions of the State, the Law, the Police, the Army, and the Navy. A consideration of the functions of these agencies leads him to the conclusion that "the evil wrought in the modern world by the excessive power of the State is very great, and very little recognized. The chief harm wrought by the State is promotion of efficiency in war....Apart from war, the modern great State is harmful from its vastness and the resulting sense of individual helplessness."² The source of these evils is the fact that power is the chief end of the State.

Toward rectifying these evils he recommends a perfection and extension of the Law as a means for settling disputes, even on an international scale.³ He recommends a new emphasis on the positive functions of the State: Community welfare, sanita-

1. Russell: "political Ideals," N. American Rev. Feb. 1917.

2. Russell: Why Men Fight, pp. 59--60.

3. ibid. p. 66.

tion, and the prevention of disease; compulsory education; encouragement of scientific research; and the diminishing of economic injustice, such as prevails in monopolies. These positive functions, however, ought to be left as much as possible in the hands of voluntary organizations so as to encourage personal initiative by making it possible for individuals to ally themselves with the particular organization which suits their taste, the function of the State being merely to exact efficiency from these organizations. These recommendations are again the extensions of the belief in the rights of individuals and reverence for their personalities.

Mr. Russell's social position is that of pure Anarchism. Though this is the ultimate ideal it "is for the present impossible, and would not survive more than a year or two at most if adopted."¹ Since this is at present impracticable he finds that "the best practicable system, to my mind, is that of Guild Socialism, which concedes what is valid both in the claims of the State Socialists and in the Syndicalist fear of the State, by adopting a system of federalism among trades for reasons similar to those which are recommending federalism among nations."²

Anarchism, the theory which Mr. Russell regards as ideal in politics, is opposed to every kind of forcible government.

1. Russell; Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. xi.

2. Ibid. pp. xi-xii.

tion, and the prevention of disease; secondary education; encouragement of scientific research; and the diminishing of economic injustices, such as prevalent in monopolies. These positive functions, however, ought to be left as much as possible in the hands of voluntary organizations so as to encourage personal initiative by making it possible for individuals to ally themselves with the particular organization which suits their taste, the function of the State being merely to exert efficiency from these organizations. These recommendations are again the extension of the belief in the rights of individuals and reverence for their personalities.

Mr. Russell's social position is that of pure Anarchism.

Though this is the ultimate ideal it "is for the present impossible, and would not survive more than a year or two at most if adopted."¹ Since this is at present impracticable he finds that "the best practicable system, to my mind, is that of Guild Socialism, which combines what is valid both in the claims of the State Socialists and in the Syndicalist view of the State, by adopting a system of federalism among trades for persons similar to those which are recommended by federalism among nations."² Anarchism, the theory which Mr. Russell regards as ideal in politics, is opposed to every kind of forcible government.

1. Russell, *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, p. xi.

2. *Ibid.* pp. xi-xii.

"It is opposed to the State as the embodiment of the force employed in the government of the community. Such government as Anarchism can tolerate must be free government, not merely in the sense that it is that of a majority, but in the sense that it is that assented to by all. Anarchists object to such institutions as the police and the criminal law, by means of which the will of one part of the community is forced upon another part.... Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed, and liberty is sought by the direct road of abolishing all forcible control over the individual by the community."¹ The Anarchism to which he holds believes in the communal ownership of land and capital.²

The desire at the bottom of Anarchism is a more just distribution of the world's goods. This is chosen as one of the direct roads to individual liberty. Anarchists maintain that if the economic organizations, now operated by capitalists could gradually be turned into self-governing communities operated by the producers there would be "an almost boundless change for the better; crime and noise might be nearly eliminated (from industry), the hideousness of industrial regions might be turned into beauty, the interest in the scientific aspects of production might become diffused among all producers with any native

1. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 33.

2. Ibid. p. 35.

intelligence, and something of the artist's joy in creation might inspire the whole of the work."¹ Work might be made so attractive that most everyone would want to work. This attraction would be salutary too, since there is to be no compulsion to work in the Anarchist society. Moreover, all common commodities are to be supplied to the limit of desire to all applicants.²

Mr. Russell objects to the Socialist doctrine that work alone gives the right to the enjoyment of the produce of work, because under the Socialist regime only the kind of work recognized will be that which commends itself to the authorities in charge. "Writing books against Socialism, or against any theory embodied in the government of the day, would certainly not be recognized as work. No more would the painting of pictures in a different style from that of the Royal Academy, or producing plays displeasing to the censor. Any new line of thought would be banned, unless by influence or corruption the thinker could crawl into the good graces of the pundits. These results are not foreseen by Socialists, because they imagine that the Socialist State will be governed by men like those who now advocate it. This is, of course, a delusion."³ To these standardizations and curtailments of liberty Mr. Russell

1. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 103.

2. Ibid. p. 104.

3. Ibid. p. 107.

intelligence, and something of the girl's joy in creation
 might inspire the whole of the work." ¹ Work might be made as

attractive that most everyone would want to work. This
 attraction would be arbitrary too, since there is to be no con-
 cision to work in the Anarchist society. Moreover, all common
 commodities are to be supplied to the limit of desire to all

conditions.

Mr. Russell objects to the Socialist doctrine that work
 alone gives the right to the enjoyment of the products of work.

However under the Socialist regime only the kind of work
 recognized will be that which commands itself to the author-
 ities in charge. Nothing done against Socialism, or against
 any theory embodied in the government of the day, would cer-
 tainly not be recognized as work. No more would the painting
 of flowers in a different style from that of the Royal Academy,

or producing plays uninteresting to the reader. Any new line
 of thought would be banned, unless by influence or corruption
 the thinker could crawl into the good graces of the guards.

These results are not foreseen by Socialists, because they
 imagine that the Socialist State will be governed by men like
 those who now advocate it. This is, of course, a delusion. ²

To these mendacious and unprincipled or liberty Mr. Russell

1. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 103.

2. Ibid. p. 104.

3. Ibid. p. 107.

is not willing to subscribe, and for these reasons he does not endorse State Socialism. Anarchism, he holds, would be more conducive to the life of the arts and sciences.

However, while Anarchism has the advantage in regard to liberty Socialism has the more effective inducements to work. When work is optional, as in Anarchism, there will be the problem of avoiding a too large idle class. Another difficulty with Anarchism is the fact that its principle which regards all law and government in some degree an evil is not, as we have noted, applicable to the present order. With society as unstable as it is some acts must be forbidden by law. To obviate these difficulties Mr. Russell suggests a plan which follows closely the lines of Kropotkin's Anarchism but is "rendered more practicable by the adoption of the main principles of Guild Socialism."¹

The specific recommendations in his plan are as follows:²

1. Compulsory education to the age of 16 and free education up to the age of 21 at least.

2. No compulsory work, but a bare livelihood for those who choose not to work and a strong public opinion in favor of work. Idleness ought to be economically possible, for this would constitute a strong motive for making work

1. Russell; Proposed Roads to Freedom, p.192.

2. Ibid. Ch. VIII.

is not willing to subscribe, and for these reasons he does not
 under State Socialism. Anarchism, he holds, would be more con-
 sistent to the life of the arts and sciences.

However, while Anarchism has the advantage in regard to liberty

Socialism has the more effective inducements to work. When
 work is optional, as in Anarchism, there will be the problem
 of avoiding a too large idle class. Another difficulty with
 Anarchism is the fact that its principles which regard all

law and government in some degree an evil is not, as we
 have noted, applicable to the present order. With society
 as unstable as it is some rule must be forbidden by law. To
 obviate these difficulties Mr. Russell suggests a plan which
 follows closely the lines of Trotsky's Anarchism but is
 "transformed more drastically by the adoption of the main
 principles of Guild Socialism."

The specific recommendations in his plan are as follows:

1. Compulsory education to the age of 16 and free
 education up to the age of 21 at least.
2. No compulsory work, but a bare livelihood for
 those who choose not to work and a strong public opinion in
 favor of work. Idleness ought to be economically possible,
 for this would constitute a strong motive for seeking work

agreeable. Four hours work a day will keep a community in comfort.

3. Every industry will be self-governing thru elected representatives. Relations between different groups of producers will be regulated by a guild congress. Matters concerning the community will continue to be settled by parliament and disputes between this body and the Guild Congress will be settled by a board composed of an equal number of representatives from each.

4. Pay will be given, not only for what is accomplished, but also for the willingness to work. Each Guild is to decide whether special skill merits extra pay. Unattractive work could be rewarded by higher pay with shorter hours.

5. Pay will be made thru some medium of exchange, preferably notes which are negotiable as long as a year from date of issue.

6. Women in domestic work, married or unmarried, will be paid, making them economically independent. Expense of children will not fall on the parents since they will receive their share of the necessities, which are to be given to all freely.

7. Government and law will exist but will be reduced to a minimum. Criminal law in regard to property violations will have become obsolete.

representative. Four hours work a day will keep a community in

comfort.

3. Every industry will be self-governing thru elected rep-

resentatives. Relations between different groups of pro-
ducers will be regulated by a Guild congress. Matters con-
cerning the community will continue to be settled by Parli-
ment and disputes between this body and the Guild Congress
will be settled by a board composed of an equal number of
representatives from each.

4. Pay will be given, not only for what is accomplished,

but also for the willingness to work. Each Guild is to
decide whether special skill merits extra pay. Unattrac-
tive work could be rewarded by higher pay with shorter

hours.

5. Pay will be made thru some medium of exchange, prefer-
ably notes which are negotiable at long as a year from date
or issue.

6. Women in domestic work, married or unmarried, will be
paid, making them economically independent. Expenses of
children will not fall on the parents since they will receive
their share of the necessities, which are to be given to all

freely.

7. Government and law will exist but will be reduced to

a minimum. Criminal law in regard to property violations

will have become obsolete.

These, briefly, are the chief points in his social position, and while they are interesting in themselves they are significant for^{us} because of the ideals out of which they grow, and which they are calculated to preserve. Mr. Russell has no hesitancy in saying that it is freedom, individual responsibility, and creativity that he is sponsoring. "I do not say freedom is the greatest of all good; the best things come from within--they are such things as creative art, and love and thought. Such things can be helped or hindered by political conditions, but not actually produced by them; and freedom is, both in itself and in its relation to these other goods, the best thing that political and economic conditions can secure."¹

We turn now from his political ideals to his ideals of marriage and love. Here again we find very much the same principles operating. It is the same conception of life applied at a different point. He says; "Those whose lives are fruitful to themselves, to their friends, or to the world are inspired by hope and sustained by joy; they see in imagination the things that might be and the way in which they are to be brought into existence. In their private relations they are not preoccupied with anxiety lest they should lose such affection and respect as they

1. Russell; Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 111.

These, briefly, are the chief points in his social position, and while they are interesting in themselves they are significant for, because of the ideals out of which they grow, and which they are calculated to preserve. Mr. Russell has no hesitancy in saying that it is freedom, individual responsibility, and creativity that he is remembering. "I do not say freedom is the greatest of all goods; the best things come from within--they are such things as creative art, and love and thought. Such things can be helped or hindered by political conditions, but not actually produced by them; and freedom is, both in itself and in its relation to these other goods, the best thing that political and economic conditions can secure."

We turn now from his political ideals to his ideals of marriage and love. Here again we find very much the same principles operating. It is the same conception of life applied at a different point. He says: "Those whose lives are limited to themselves, to their friends, or to the world are inspired by hope and sustained by joy; they see in imagination the things that might be and the way in which they are to be brought into existence. In their private relations they are not preoccupied with anxiety lest they should lose such affection and respect as they

J. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 111.

receive; they are engaged in giving affection and respect freely, and the reward comes of itself without their seeking. (*Italics mine*) A life lived in this spirit--the spirit that aims at creating rather than possessing--has a certain fundamental happiness, of which it cannot be wholly robbed by adverse circumstances. This is the way of life recommended in the Gospels, and by all the great teachers of the world. Those who have found it are freed from the tyranny of fear, since what they value most in their lives is not at the mercy of outside power. If all men could summon up the courage and vision to live in this way in spite of obstacles and discouragement, there would be no need for the regeneration of the world to begin by political and economic reform; all that is needed in the way of reform would come automatically, without resistance, owing to the moral regeneration of individuals. But the teaching of Christ has been nominally accepted by the world for many centuries, and yet those who follow it are still persecuted as they were before the time of Constantine."¹

These words, though written in 1919 as the basis of political reform, had tremendous implications for marriage. These implications are drawn out in complete detail in a book, Marriage and Morals, which appeared ten years later. The text of this book was announced in the quotation above; They who

1. Russell, proposed Roads to Freedom, pp. 186--187.

receive; they are engaged in giving attention and respect freely, and the reward comes of itself without their seeking. (Ibid. 100) A life lived in this spirit--the spirit that aims at creating rather than possessing--has a certain fundamental happiness, of which it cannot be wholly robbed by adverse circumstances. This is the way of life recommended in the Gospel, and by all the great teachers of the world. Those who have found it are freed from the tyranny of fear, since what they value most in their lives is not at the mercy of outside power. If all men could witness to the courage and vision to live in this way in spite of obstacles and discouragement, there would be no need for the regeneration of the world to begin by political and economic reform; all that is needed in the way of reform would come automatically, without resistance, owing to the moral regeneration of individuals. But the teaching of Christ has been repeatedly attacked by the world for many centuries, and yet those who follow it are still persecuted as they were before the time of Constantine.¹ These words, though written in 1919 on the basis of political reform, had tremendous implications for marriage. These implications are drawn out in somewhat detail in a book, Marriage and Morals, which appeared ten years later. The text of this book was announced in the quotation above; they who

1. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, pp. 186--187.

"are engaged in giving affection and respect freely." There are many critics who hold that undoubtedly Mr. Russell wrote this book with great deference to "freedom" but with little concern for "affection and respect". This, however, we shall find later to be open to question.

Mr. Russell thinks that the main causes of unhappiness at present are; "ill-health, poverty, and an unsatisfactory sex life."¹ We have already noted how he has conducted his attack on poverty and the slavery of which it is a symptom. His attack on the last factor is presented in Marriage and Morals and, from the standpoint of child training, in Education and the Good Life. We may concern ourselves with the presentation in the former, since, once that is decided upon, the kind of education to follow will be obvious. It is true, however, that Mr. Russell regards early education in sex as a part of the root of the evil, but this is true because his ideals in sex are at variance with those commonly taught to children. A change in ideals calls for a change in education, the nature of the education being determined by this change in ideals. We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the changes in the sex ideal which he considers feasible.

The thing which passes for "reverence" in the sex training of children Mr. Russell calls by another name, "Fear".

1. Russell, Selected papers, p. 192

"are engaged in giving affection and respect freely." There are many critics who hold that undoubtedly Mr. Russell wrote this book with great deference to "freedom" but with little concern for "affection and respect". This, however, we shall find later to be open to question.

Mr. Russell thinks that the main causes of unhappiness at present are: "ill-health, poverty, and an unsatisfactory sex life." We have already noted how he has conducted his attack on poverty and the slavery of which it is a symptom. His attack on the last factor is presented in Marriage and Morals and from the standpoint of child training, in Education and the Good Life. We may concern ourselves with the presentation in the former, since that is decided upon, the kind of education to follow will be obvious. It is true, however, that Mr. Russell regards early education in sex as a part of the root of the evil, but this is true because his ideals in sex are at variance with those commonly taught to children. A change in ideals calls for a change in education, the nature of the education being determined by this change in ideals. We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the changes in the sex ideal which he considers feasible.

The thing which passes for "restraint" in the sex training of children Mr. Russell calls by another name, "Fear".

"Fear has been thought the only way to make women 'virtuous,' and they have been deliberately taught to be cowards, both physically and mentally. Women in whom love is cramped encourage brutality and hypocrisy in their husbands, and distort the instincts of their children. One generation of fearless women could transform the world, by bringing into it a generation of fearless children, not contorted into unnatural shapes, but straight and candid, generous, affectionate, and free. Their ardor would sweep away the cruelty and pain which we endure because we are lazy, cowardly, hard-hearted and stupid."¹

He maintains that the kinds of fear which have constituted the basis of feminine virtue in the past are "fear of hell-fire and the fear of pregnancy."² Both of these fears can be removed now since the decay of traditional theology and the development of contraceptives. With the possibility of the removal of these fears, and with them the "brutality and hypocrisy" of which they are the cause, the way to the good life, the "generous and free" life, is opened. But what constitutes the "good" life? Is it to be a Saturnalia characterized by the absence of shame and freedom from offspring? It is at this point that many of the critics of Mr. Russell shoot high and wide. This remains to be made clear.

Mr. Russell does not advocate sexual license. He says,

1. Russell, Selected papers, pp. 192-93.

2. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 84.

"Fear has been thought the only way to make women 'virtuous', and they have been deliberately taught to be cowards, both physically and mentally. Women in whom love is cramped and courage brutally and hypocritically in their husbands, and distort the instincts of their children. One generation of fearless women could transform the world, by bringing into it a generation of fearless children, not cramped into unnatural spaces, but straight and candid, generous, affectionate, and free. Their error would sweep away the cruelty and pain which we endure because we are lazy, cowardly, hard-hearted and stupid."

He maintains that the kinds of fear which have constituted the basis of feminine virtue in the past are "fear of hell-fire and the fear of pregnancy." Both of these fears can be removed now since the decay of traditional theology and the development of contraceptives. With the possibility of the removal of these fears, and with them the "brutality and hypocrisy" of which they are the cause, the way to the good life, the "generous and free" life, is opened. But what constitutes the "good" life is it to be a *Satanstoe* characterized by the absence of shame and freedom from obligation? It is at this point that many of the critics of Mr. Russell shoot high and wide. This remains to be made clear.

Mr. Russell does not advocate sexual license, he says,

1. Russell, *Selected Essays*, pp. 192-93.
2. Russell, *Marriage and Morals*, p. 84.

"I do not think that the new system any more than the old should involve an unbridled yielding to impulse...."¹ Again, "The morality which I should advocate does not consist simply of saying to grown-up people or to adolescents, 'Follow your impulses and do as you like.' There has to be consistency in life; there has to be continuous effort directed to ends that are not immediately beneficial and not at every moment attractive; there has to be consideration for others; and there should be certain standards of rectitude."² These modifications of basic impulse are needed because "...civilized people cannot fully satisfy their sexual instinct without love. The instinct is not completely satisfied unless a man's whole being, mental quite as much as physical, enters into the relation. Those who have never known the deep intimacy and the intense companionship of happy mutual love have missed the best thing that life has to give."³ "I am not suggesting that there should be no morality and so self-restraint in regard to sex, any more than in regard to food....A comprehensive sexual ethic cannot regard sex merely as a natural hunger and a possible source of danger. Both these points of view are important, but it is even more important to remember that sex is connected with some of the greatest goods in human life....No civilized man, and no savage that I have ever heard of, is satisfied in his instinct

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 92.

2. Ibid., p. 311.

3. Ibid., p. 158.

"I do not think that the new system any more than the old should involve an unbridled yielding to impulses...." Again, "The morality which I should advocate does not consist simply of saying to grown-up people or to adolescents, 'Follow your impulses and do as you like.' There has to be consistency in life; there has to be continuous effort directed to ends that are not immediately beneficial and not at every moment attractive; there has to be consideration for others; and there should be certain standards of rectitude."² These modifications of basic impulse are needed because "...civilized people cannot fully satisfy their sexual instinct without love. The instinct is not completely satisfied unless a man's whole being, mental quite as much as physical, enters into the relation. Those who have never known the deep intimacy and the intense companionship of happy sexual love have missed the best thing that life has to give."³ "I am not suggesting that there should be no morality and no self-restraint in regard to sex, any more than in regard to food.... A comprehensive sexual ethic cannot regard sex merely as a natural hunger and a possible source of danger. Both these points of view are important, but it is even more important to remember that sex is connected with some of the greatest goods in human life.... No civilized man, and no savage that I have ever heard of, is satisfied in his instinct

1. Russell, various and various, p. 92.
2. ibid., p. 311.
3. ibid., p. 158.

by the bare sexual act. If the impulse which leads to the act is to be satisfied, there must be courtship, there must be love, there must be companionship."¹ These quotations are probably sufficient to show that the freedom which Mr. Russell is seeking is not an indiscriminate sex freedom.

We may ask then if it is not sex that is to be liberated, what is it? We let Mr. Russell answer for himself; "To secure as little interference with love as is compatible with the interests of children should be one of the main purposes of a wise sexual ethic."² (*Italics mine*) It is love that is to be made free and it is to be made as free as possible, even in marriage, but this freedom must not infringe upon the rights of children. Love is to be open-eyed and fearless, drawing upon the instinctive parts of man's nature, which Mr. Russell would have "trained" rather than "curbed."³ He would have love liberated because, as we noted above, he regards love as the "best thing that life has to give." "I believe myself," he says, "that romantic love is the source of the most intense delights that life has to offer. In the relations of a man and woman who love each other with passion and imagination and tenderness, there is something of inestimable value, to be ignorant of which is a great misfortune to any human being. I think it important that a social system should be such as to permit this joy, although it can only be an ingredient in life and not its

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, pp. 293-94 and 297.

2. Ibid., p. 129.

3. Ibid., p. 310.

main purpose."¹

It may be pointed out, on the contrary, and indeed Mr. Russell is aware of it, that "love is an anarchic force which, if left free, will not remain within any bounds set by law or custom."² Is it not, therefore, carrying coals to Newcastle to talk of liberating this disruptive force? To this problem Mr. Russell replies that when there are no children involved as the result of a union, the problem is not serious.. Consequently, he does not regard a union as marriage when it is childless.³ Childless unions are a matter of individual concern and of no interest to the law. As a matter of fact he would have a certificate of pregnancy accompany the application of a couple for marriage.⁴ This would make possible "sex relations as a dignified, rational, wholehearted activity in which the complete personality cooperates." and put an end to the silly "bootlegged" sex which is carried on at the present time in the spirit of "bravado" and under the ban of society. He holds that comparatively permanent partnerships among students would be a good thing (provided, of course, we accept his definition of a sex relation as one involving affection and love; we may understand that when he recommends sex it is always this definition of sex). In addition to solving the problem of the unusual sex strain of adolescent years under the best possible auspices, these partnerships

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 74.

2. Ibid., p. 128.

3. Ibid., p. 156

4. Russell's letter, quoted by Judge Ben Lindsay, The Companionate Marriage, p. 210. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927.

would have the additional advantage of being excellent preparation and training for marriage, for he holds that it is not desirable "that either a man or woman should enter upon the serious business of a marriage intended to lead to children without having had previous sexual experience."¹ Moreover, "stable relations with one partner are difficult for many people until they have had some experience of variety. If our outlook on sex were sane, we should expect university students to be temporarily married, though childless. They would in this way be freed from the obsession of sex which at present greatly interferes with work. They would acquire that experience of the other sex which is desirable as a prelude to the serious partnership of a marriage with children. And they would be free to experience love without the concomitants of subterfuge, concealment, and dread of disease, which at present poison youthful adventures."² These unions, if they do not prove to be permanent, can be dissolved without embarrassment to either party or offense to society.

This takes care of liberated love outside of the family relationship but what is to be done after children have arrived to complicate the situation? Must not the pursuit of love then be abandoned for more serious matters? We can best answer this complicated question by first noting in what esteem Mr. Russell holds the family relationship.

For him marriage (which always means a union issuing in

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 166.

2. Ibid., p. 282.

children) is an institution of cardinal importance; "Marriage is something more serious than the pleasure of two people in each other's company; it is an institution which, through the fact that it gives rise to children, forms part of the intimate texture of society and has an importance extending far beyond the personal feelings of the husband and wife."¹ Again he emphasizes; "...the stability of marriage is to my mind a matter of considerable importance....I think that where a marriage is fruitful and both parties to it are reasonable and decent the expectation ought to be that it will be lifelong..."²

Marriage is important from two points of view, that of the child and that of the parents. "parental affection, when it is of the right sort, undoubtedly furthers a child's development....The affection of parents makes infants feel safe in this dangerous world, and gives them boldness in experimentation and in exploration of their environment....If a child is to grow up happy, expansive, and fearless, he needs a certain warmth in his environment which it is difficult to get except through parental affection....There is another service which a wise father and mother can perform for their children...they can introduce them to the facts of sex and parenthood in the best possible way."³ It is because of these very important advantages for children that he views with apprehension the growing tendency to substitute the State for the family, as in matters

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 76.

2. Ibid., p. 142

3. Ibid., pp. 194-95.

of education, health, etc. The tendency so far has been salutary, making for less cruelty to children. But there are "very grave dangers" in substituting entirely the State for the family. The State is impersonal and has no regard for the individual. Administrators are not likely to "regard human beings as ends in themselves, but as material for some kind of construction. Moreover, the administrator invariably likes uniformity.... Children handed over to the mercy of institutions will therefore tend to be all alike, while the few who cannot conform to the recognized pattern will suffer persecution."¹ In addition to stifling individuality the State, being the only one to whom children would be responsible, would take advantage of this situation in international relations. This would be "grave reason to fear that the world would become even more bloodthirsty than it is at present."²

Although there are these dangers, he considers it "far from improbable" that in the future the State may completely replace the father--by offering pay and protection for motherhood and support for children. But he does not consider this a desirable thing; "The break-up of the family, if it comes about, will not be, to my mind, a matter for rejoicing."³ This he holds for the reasons mentioned above, namely, those which establish the family relationship as of cardinal importance for children.

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 217.

2. Ibid., p. 218.

3. Ibid., p. 308.

He regards the family relationship, however, as of even more importance to parents: "The family is important at the present day more through the emotions with which it provides parents than for any other reason. Parental emotions in men as well as in women are perhaps more important than any others, in their power of influencing action. Both men and women who have children as a rule regulate their lives largely with reference to them, and children cause perfectly ordinary men and women to act unselfishly in certain ways, of which perhaps life insurance is the most definite and measurable."¹

From the standpoint of the mother the family relationship is important because it answers her desire for protection during pregnancy. This might be taken care of if the State were to offer absolute protection and support for expectant mothers, but there would still remain a disadvantage, namely, "the abolition of the father's place in the home would be the (cause of a) diminution in the intimacy and seriousness of their (women's) relations with men. Human beings are so constructed that each sex has much to learn from the other, but mere sex relations, even when they are passionate, do not suffice for these lessons. Cooperation in the serious business of rearing children, and companionship through the long years involved, bring about a relation more important and more enriching to both parties

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 183.

than any that would exist if men had not responsibility for their children. And I do not think that mothers who live in a purely feminine atmosphere, or whose contacts with men are trivial, will, except in a minority of cases, be quite so good for their children from the point of view of emotional education as those who are happily married and cooperating at each stage with their husbands."¹

From the standpoint of the father the family relationship has effects more important. "Much the most important question in relation to the family in individual psychology is the effect upon the father."² If law and custom should dictate that children belonged to the mother alone and if the State offered the protection to mothers which now falls upon the fathers then the effect upon male psychology would be serious. It would "immensely diminish the seriousness of men's relations to women, making them more and more a matter of mere pleasure, not an intimate union of heart and mind and body. It would tend towards a certain triviality in all personal relations, so that a man's serious emotions would be concerned with his career, his country, or some quite impersonal subject....My belief is, though I put it forward with some hesitation, that the elimination of pater-
ternity as a recognized social relation would tend to make men's emotional life trivial and thin, causing in the end a slowly growing boredom and despair, in which procreation

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 199.

2. Ibid., p. 201.

then any that would exist if men had not responsibility for their children. And I do not think that mothers who live in a purely feminine atmosphere, or whose contacts with men are trivial, will, except in a minority of cases, be quite so good for their children from the point of view of emotional education as those who are happily married and cooperating at each stage with

their husbands."

From the standpoint of the father-son relationship has always been important. "With the most important question in relation to the family in individual psychology is the effect upon the father." It is law and custom should dictate that children belong to the mother alone and if the State ordered the protection to mothers which now falls upon the fathers then the effect upon male psychology would be serious. It would "immensely diminish the seriousness of men's relations to women, making them more and more a matter of mere pleasure, not an intimate union of heart and mind and body. It would tend towards a certain triviality in all personal relations, so that a man's serious emotions would be concerned with his career, his country, or some quite impersonal subject.... My belief is, though I put it forward with some hesitation, that the elimination of personality as a recognized social relation would tend to make men's emotional life trivial and thin, causing in the end a slowly growing boredom and despair, in which expression

would gradually die out, leaving the human race to be replenished by stocks that had preserved the older convention."¹

The result of our study, to this point, of Mr. Russell's ideals of marriage and love may be summarized as follows: He regards the love relationship as the greatest good which life has to offer and feels that it ought to be purified and liberated. He regards the family relationship as having the most serious significance for the children, for the parents, and for society. He feels that this relationship ought to be life-long. Now we return to the question which we raised above but did not answer, namely, How can the family relationship be rendered stable if the pursuit of love is not abandoned at marriage, and if the pursuit of love is abandoned at marriage are not the individuals concerned losing so much of the greatest good that life has to offer? We may take the last part of the question first.

It will be remembered that one of the advantages which Mr. Russell hoped to realize from the childless partnerships of college days is the fact that these experiences would make for a wiser choice of a life companion. It may be inferred from this that he expects a well-matched couple to find in the marriage relationship a continued experience of the values of love. He confirms this inference in so many words: "It is, of course, a very good thing when a husband and wife love each other so completely that neither is ever tempted to unfaithfulness..."²

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 203.

2. Ibid., p. 316.

Again: "A marriage which begins with passionate love and leads to children who are desired and loved ought to produce so deep a tie between a man and woman that they will feel something infinitely precious in their companionship, even after sexual passion has decayed, and even if either or both feels sexual passion for some one else.." ¹

This last condition, "even if either or both feels sexual passion for some one else", introduces a new element into the situation. It may be true that experiment before marriage will enable one to choose a mate more wisely but Mr. Russell seems to believe that no matter how wise the choice, it is not likely that the mate will be so satisfactory, or the conditions so auspicious that one or the other will never feel an attraction to some one else. This also he confirms, "There can be no doubt that to close one's mind on marriage against all the approaches of love from elsewhere is to diminish receptivity and sympathy and the opportunities of valuable human contacts. It is to do violence to something which, is in itself desirable. And like every kind of restrictive morality it tends to promote what one may call a policeman's outlook upon the whole of human life--the outlook, that is to say, which is always looking for an opportunity to forbid something."² He thinks further, that it is not likely that individuals will go through life and marriage without feeling attractions outside. "Unless people are restrained by

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 142.

2. Ibid., p. 141.

inhibition or strong moral scruples, it is very unlikely that they will go through life without occasionally having strong impulses to adultery. But such impulses do not by any means necessarily imply that the marriage no longer serves its purpose. There may still be ardent affection between husband and wife, and every desire that the marriage should continue. Suppose, for example, that a man has to be away from home on business for a number of months on end. If he is physically vigorous, he will find it difficult to remain continent throughout this time, however fond he may be of his wife. The same will apply to his wife, if she is not entirely convinced of the correctness of conventional morality. Infidelity under such circumstances ought to form no barrier whatever to subsequent happiness, and in fact it does not where the husband and wife do not consider it necessary to indulge in melodramatic orgies of jealousy."¹

Now, in view of the fact that there is strong likelihood that there will be attractions outside, Mr. Russell is going to provide for them. He feels that to exact faithfulness in the presence of these attractions outside would be to lay so much in the way of achieving the good life. "A good life cannot be founded upon fear, prohibition, and mutual interference with freedom. Where faithfulness is achieved without these, it is good, but where all this is necessary it may well be that too high a price has been paid, and that a little mutual toleration

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 231.

of occasional lapses would be better. There can be no doubt that mutual jealousy, even where there is physical faithfulness, often causes more unhappiness in a marriage than would be caused if there were more confidence in the ultimate strength of a deep and permanent affection."¹

A thing is implied in this last sentence which throws light on our problem. These extra-marital affections, with which Mr. Russell is here dealing are clearly subordinate to the marriage affection, and do not constitute a challenge to the fundamental character of the marriage affection, which is "deep and permanent". They are temporary attractions involving sympathy, understanding, and mutual delight (which we saw are a part of his definition of sex) but they are passing fancies. He says: "Marriage should be a partnership intended by both parties to last at least as long as the youth of their children, at and not regarded by either as ^{at} the mercy of temporary amours."² (*Italics mine.*) "...each party should be able to put up with such temporary fancies as are always liable to occur, provided ^(Italics mine) the underlying affection remains intact." [^] The psychology of adultery has been falsified by conventional morals, which assume, in monogamous countries, that attraction to one person cannot coexist with a serious affection for another. Everybody knows that this is untrue, yet everybody is liable, under the influence of jealousy, to fall back upon this untrue theory..."³

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 316.

2. Ibid., 235.

3. Ibid., 231.

It is in order to close up this possible outlet for jealousy and to open this possible field of happiness that Mr. Russell recommends that adultery not be considered an adequate grounds for divorce. He thinks the better way is to teach both partners to control jealousy and develop a spirit of generosity and reverence toward each other such that temporary fancies of this kind will be possible.

However, there is an acute problem which arises at this point. What is to be done in case the outside fancy takes on proportions such that it eclipses the affection of the marriage relation? Suppose it involves a deliberate preference for another person? This problem, when it occurs is serious for it means failure of the marriage, and involves the rights of children, and it is to be remembered that children are the thing which renders a marriage significant for Mr. Russell, for otherwise it is not marriage.

So far as I am able to determine, Mr. Russell has two recommendations for cases of this kind. First, parents should remember that the rights of children take precedence over their feeling for each other (or the absence of such feeling). "The husband and wife, if they have any love for their children, will so regulate their conduct as to give their children the best chance of a happy and healthy development. This may involve, at times, very considerable self-repression. And it certainly

requires that both should realize the superiority of the claims of children to the claims of their own romantic emotions."¹

This position has been criticised by Mr. Lipmann on the ground that parents who do not love each other passionately will not cooperate in the rearing of children. Mr. Russell defends himself on the ground that he knows of a large number of cases in which the contrary is true and cites as further proof the situation in France where parents are very dutiful in spite of exceptional freedom in adultery. He points out further that this criticism ignores the emotion of parental affection which, "where it is genuine and strong, preserves an unbreakable tie between husband and wife long after physical passion has decayed."² We may conclude that in his opinion it is possible for parents to cooperate in the rearing of their children in spite of an overpowering affection outside, if both will tolerate the presence of this outside affection.

The second recommendation applies to cases "...where one or both parties have not sufficient self-control to prevent disagreements from coming to the knowledge of the children, (in which) it may well be better that the marriage should be dissolved. It is by no means the case that the dissolution of a marriage is invariably the worst thing possible from the point of view of the children; indeed it is not nearly so bad as the spectacle of raised voices, furious accusations, perhaps even violence, to

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 236.

2. Ibid., p. 237.

regret that both should realize the superiority of the child
or children to the claims of their own romantic emotions.¹
This position has been criticized by Mr. Gibson on the
ground that parents who do not love each other necessarily will
not cooperate in the rearing of children. Mr. Russell defends
himself on the ground that he knows of a large number of cases
in which the contrary is true and cites as further proof the
attention in France where parents are very careful to call to order of
excessive passion in children. He points out further that
this criticism ignores the emotion of parental affection which,
"where it is genuine and strong, preserves an unbreakable tie
between husband and wife long after physical passion has decayed."²
We may conclude that in his opinion it is possible for parents
to cooperate in the rearing of their children in spite of an
overpowering attraction outside. It does not tolerate the parents
of this outside attraction.

The second recommendation applies to cases "...where the
or both parties have not sufficient self-control to prevent
disappearance from coming to the knowledge of the children, in
which it may well be better that the marriage should be dissolved.
It is by no means the case that the dissolution of a marriage
is invariably the worst thing possible for the child or children
or the children; indeed it is not nearly so bad as the spectacle
of raised voices, various accusations, perhaps even violence, to

1. Russell, *Marriage and Morals*, p. 232.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

which many children are exposed in bad homes."¹

It should be remembered that Mr. Russell does not approve these cases as ideal representations of marriage and that marriage for him, when it is as it should be, is a spontaneous, delightful, free, creative association which enlists the whole personalities of each partner. It should be further pointed out that such breakdowns as those to which the above recommendations apply are intended to be reduced to a minimum by his theory of marriage, and the possibilities of the marriage relationship are intended to be magnified. These things will be accomplished when love is made free because "love can flourish only as long as it is free and spontaneous; it tends to be killed by the thought that it is a duty."² These things will be rendered more likely when there is freedom for experience in love before entering the serious relationship of marriage.

It may be objected that this liberating of love will, in many cases, amount to little more than sexual license. This is admitted but it is pointed out that "sex intercourse apart from love has little value, and is to be regarded primarily as experimentation with a view to love."³ It would be well if these could be avoided, but to do so would require a legal machinery so oppressive that the finer experiments in love would be crushed with the baser.

Mr. Russell has not lost faith in marriage. He still

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 317.

2. Ibid., p. 140.

3. Ibid., p. 128.

believes that it is a relationship capable of great value but only under certain conditions. "The essence of a good marriage is respect for each other's personality combined with that deep intimacy, physical, mental, and spiritual, which makes a serious love between man and woman the most fructifying of all human experiences."¹ He does not think this is possible without self-control, but the thing to be controlled is the spirit of jealousy, for it is "better to control a restrictive and hostile emotion such as jealousy, rather than a generous and expansive emotion such as love."²

We may say in conclusion that Mr. Russell's practical ethics in regard to marriage and love are characterized by the application of the same spirit of freedom and reverence for the rights of the individual personality as we found in his political and social ideals.

We have spent a great deal of time elaborating his interpretation of the morality of the marriage relation because much superficial criticism is waged at this point. Aspiring critics hope to silence him by showing that he is inimical to the stability of the family, or that he is an advocate of license, or that he is an "uncontrolled thinker", or what not.

One such criticism is that of Senator Bruce, set forth in his review of Marriage and Morals.³ He infers by a juxtaposition

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 320.

2. Ibid., p. 239.

3. William Cabell Bruce. "A Criticism of Bertrand Russell's New Morality." Current History, March, 1930.

of isolated quotations that Mr. Russell favors the maternal to the bi-parental family. He points out that the divorce situation is not loose enough and that Mr. Russell would have adultery no cause for divorce. Divorce, says he, is "interesting to this innovator only 'as a transitional step on the way from the bi-parental to the purely maternal family'". He points out further that the state is taking the place of the father. These citations are accurate but it is not to be inferred that Mr. Russell approves them. In fact, he says in the next paragraph, "easy divorce does not afford a genuine solution to the marriage problem."¹ We have already noted that he casts his vote for the stability of the family but the Senator criticises his "daringly destructive" and "licentious view" on the ground that the family ought not to be supplanted by a relationship inspired by "the most capricious and fugitive of our physical appetites...terminable at any moment... at the will of the parties to it." "...marriage owes its durability rather to moral principles than to mere sexual attraction which steadily declines." With all of this Mr. Russell would agree heartily. The Senator rounds out his case with the parting shot that one cause of divorce is the "speculative aphrodisiacs of theoretical writers who find in these habits a gainful field of literary profit." With this also Mr. Russell would probably agree, since he makes it a habit not to answer personal thrusts.

1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 238.

The Senator is not alone in his contempt for Mr. Russell. Dr. Logan Clendening adds his measure of contempt for these "speculative aphrodisiacs" by showing that Mr. Russell is an "uncontrolled thinker".¹ Such a person is one who has "that amusing habit of...having a new thought and instantly proclaim it as true....Although Mr. Russell is supposed to be a man of science no one indulges in more uncontrolled thinking. And his pronouncements are made doubly dangerous because he has two disarming qualities; one is his superficial appearance of saintliness; the other is his widespread reputation for intellectual profundity." These denunciations remind us of those we encountered at the beginning of our study, which Prof. Perry felt it necessary to correct. We may look over these, however, since Dr. Clendening is a physician rather than a philosopher and his criticisms give evidence of the fact that he is out of his field.

There is another kind of criticism waged against this "new morality" which is more sober but hardly more exact. This kind is represented by Mrs. Walter Warrick, who classes Russell with Joseph Wood Krutch, Ernest Hemingway, Aldous Huxley, and the other apostles of biological sophistication. She says,² "The Krutches and Russells of this world jump to the conclusion that the youngsters share the cynicism of their somewhat weary selves." "Mr. Russell does not know it but he is fast becoming old fashioned." He thinks his children are just like him, their

1. Logan Clendening. "Sex Madness." Forum, October, 1930
 2. Mrs. Walter D. Warrick. "Farewell to Sophistication." Harpers, October, 1930

The Senator is not alone in his contempt for Mr. Russell.

Dr. Logan Glandorp adds his measure of contempt for these "conclusive epistemologists" by showing that Mr. Russell is an "uncontrolled thinker".¹ Such a person is one who has "that amazing habit of...having a new thought and instantly proclaiming it as true....Although Mr. Russell is supposed to be a man of science and one indulges in more uncontrolled thinking. And his pronouncements are made doubly dangerous because he has two dissimilar qualities; one is his superficial appearance of saintliness; the other is his widespread reputation for intellectual profundity." These denunciations remind us of those we encountered at the beginning of our study, which Prof. Perry felt it necessary to correct. We may look over these, however, since Dr. Glandorp is a cynic rather than a philosopher and his criticisms give evidence of the fact that he is out of his field.

There is another kind of criticism waged against this "new morality" which is more sober but hardly more exact. This kind is represented by Mrs. Walter Warwick, who classes Russell with Joseph Wood Krutch, Ernest Hemingway, Aldous Huxley, and the other associates of biological association. She says: "The Krutches and Russells of this world turn to the conclusion that the youngsters share the cynicism of their somewhat weary selves." Mr. Russell does not know it but he is fast becoming old fashioned. He thinks his children are just like him, their

1. Logan Glandorp, "Max Haddess," Forum, October, 1930.
2. Mrs. Walter G. Warwick, "Russell to Epistemology," Harpers, October, 1930.

favorite books being "The Triumph of Mechanism and The Downfall of the Home."

The objection to this criticism is that one cannot class Russell with Krutch, Hemingway, and Huxley without doing violence to the facts. The conclusion these men draw from our enlightened age is complete despair; the conclusion Mr. Russell draws is hope. These men have lost faith in reason and confidence in love (if Mr. Krutch is to be taken as spokesman). Mr. Russell has done neither. Aside from this, there is the consideration that Mr. Russell himself repudiates any such connection: "Mr. Krutch's Modern Temper is pathetic." "One of Mr. Krutch's most pathetic chapters deals with the subject of love."¹ Again he says, "I lived too long myself in the Victorian age to be a modern according to Mr. Krutch's standards. I have by no means lost my belief in love..."² Such statements as these make the identification of Mr. Russell with the school of literary biologists very difficult and any criticism based on this identification is likely, therefore, to be superficial.

I mention these criticism of Russell for they are characteristic of the popular trend of objection to his morality of marriage. In my opinion they do not go deep enough; they are superficial and inadequate. If Mr. Russell is answered he must be answered in terms of his own philosophy. Nothing whatever is to be gained by calling him an "uncontrolled thinker" or misrepresenting his

1. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, pp. 32 and 35.

2. Ibid., p. 37.

favorite books being "The Triumph of Reason and The Downfall of the Home."

The objection to this criticism is that one cannot class Russell with Kitchin, Hemingway, and Huxley without doing violence to the latter. The conception these men draw from our enlightenment age is somewhat different; the conception Mr. Russell draws is hope. These men have lost faith in reason and confidence in love (Mr. Kitchin is to be taken as spokesman). Mr. Russell has done neither. Aside from this, there is the consideration that Mr. Russell himself resolutely rejects any such connection; "Mr. Kitchin's Modern Temper in America," "one of Mr. Kitchin's most pathetic chapters deals with the subject of love." Again he says, "I lived too long myself in the Victorian age to be a modern according to Mr. Kitchin's standards. I have by no means lost my belief in love..."² Such statements as these make the identification of Mr. Russell with the school of literary biologists very difficult and any criticism based on this identification is likely, therefore, to be superficial.

I mention these criticisms of Russell for they are characteristic of the popular trend of objection to his morality of marriage. In my opinion they do not go deep enough; they are superficial and inadequate. If Mr. Russell is answered he must be answered in terms of his own philosophy. Nothing whatever is to be gained by calling him an "uncontrolled thinker" or misrepresenting his

1. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, pp. 32 and 33.
2. Ibid., p. 37.

point of view. He gives cogent reasons why his practical ethics ought to make for a larger release of life and these reasons must either be accepted or shown to be faulty. personally, as I have tried to show, I think they must be accepted. This shifts the criticism to another point, one which is after all more vulnerable. However, before we are ready to make this criticism we have one more exhibit of his practical ethics, namely, his ideals of personal happiness. This may be dealt with briefly.

His ideals of personal happiness are set forth in a non-technical treatise, The Conquest of Happiness. The theme of the book is implied in the opening chapter, "There is no ultimate satisfaction in the cultivation of one element of human nature at the expense of all others."¹ He believes that happiness is attained by the elimination of conflict from personality and the attainment of harmony. "The time spent in producing harmony between the different parts of one's personality is time usefully employed."²

The book is divided into two parts, the causes of unhappiness and the causes of happiness. Chief among the causes of unhappiness noted are an unwholesome preoccupation with one's self; a misdirected desire for power as in competition, envy, and the desire to persecute; and unfounded sense of guilt or shame; and fear. The main causes of happiness, on the other hand,

1. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, p. 22.

2. Ibid., p. 232.

are an objectification of interests; a wide exercise of affection; an energetic attitude toward life, buttressed by a broad impersonal outlook on life and the ability for submission.

Mr. Russell is recommending what has proved helpful in his own experience as the key to happiness, namely, the discovering of what things he desired most and the setting out to achieve these things.¹ He has achieved harmony among his desires and attained the widest possible expression for as many of them as are compatible with harmony. He proceeds on the assumption that "in a rational ethic it will be laudable to give pleasure to any one, even to oneself, provided there is no counterbalancing pain to oneself or others."² He writes, he says, as a hedonist, assuming that happiness is the good, but he admits that the acts he recommends "are on the whole the same as those to be recommended by the sane moralist."³

As he works out his hedonistic ethic it assumes a form commendable to all from the standpoint of personal ideals. He does not believe that uncontrolled passion will solve¹ the problem of the relation between the sexes, and no more does he believe that uncontrolled desire will lead to the good life. The good life, he tells us, is that which "makes for happiness both in ones self and in others."⁴ This is to be achieved by minimizing hatred and envy and cultivating passionate love, parental affection, friendship, benevolence and devotion to science and art.⁵

1. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, p. 17.

2. Ibid., p. 99.

3. Ibid., p. 247.

4. Ibid., p. 108.

5. Ibid.

are an objectification of interests; a wide exercise of attention; an energetic attitude toward life, buttressed by a broad impersonal outlook on life and the ability for submission.

Mr. Russell is recommending what has proved helpful in his own experience as the key to happiness, namely, the discovery of what things he desired most and the setting out to achieve these things.¹ He has achieved harmony among his desires and attained the widest possible expression for as many of them as are compatible with harmony. He proceeds on the assumption that "in a rational ethic it will be feasible to give pleasure to any one, even to oneself, provided there is no counterbalancing pain to oneself or others."² He writes, he says, as a hedonist, assuming that happiness is the good, but he adds that the acts he recommends "are on the whole the same as those to be recommended by the same moralist."³

As he works out his hedonistic ethic it assumes a form commendable to all from the standpoint of personal ideals. He does not believe that uncontrolled passion will solve the problem⁴ or the relation between the sexes, and no more does he believe that uncontrolled desire will lead to the good life. The good life, he tells us, is that which "makes for happiness both in ones self and in others."⁵ This is to be achieved by minimizing hatred and envy and cultivating passionate love, parental affection, friendship, benevolence and devotion to science and art.⁶

1. Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness*, p. 17.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

5. *Ibid.*

From the standpoint of personal ideals and the expansive life there is certainly nothing here that is offensive. Mr. Russell's idea of the good life might be very easily mistaken for the idea of a perfectionist or a self-realizationist in ethics.

The conclusion to which we come, having reviewed the field of his practical ethics is that his motives are unselfish and his practical idealism is high, being characterized in politics, education, marriage, and personal happiness by an emphasis on the rights of the individual (as a member of a social group) and by an emphasis upon the creative, rather than the possessive, tendencies in human nature. Without going into the separate details of his reform program and an evaluation of each argument we accept the general plan and particularly the ideals upon which it rests as beyond reproach. If fault is to be found we believe it must be found elsewhere. This is the task of the pages to come.

1. Russell, *Practical Ethics*, p. 74.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Chapter III.

practical Ethics Without a parent.

In taking up a criticism of Mr. Russell's ethics we direct attention first to the point where his practical ethics joins on to his philosophy. There is a weakness at this union of such a nature that if criticism is focused sharply upon it the point of connection will be dissolved, leaving his practical ethics suspended in mid air. His salutary conclusions will have come into being without a parent. They will be seen to be less fortunate even than Athene, who sprang full-grown from the head of Zeus. To the task of showing this disjunction between Mr. Russell's ethics and his philosophy we now turn our attention.

philosophy for Mr. Russell is Science generalized. He draws no conclusions beyond those which are warranted by the sciences. "What I wish to bring to your notice is the possibility and importance of applying to philosophical problems certain broad principles of method which have been found successful in the study of scientific questions."¹

Mr. Russell rules out of philosophy the notion of the universe and the notions of good and evil. There is no such thing as a "universe" for "the apparent oneness of the world is merely the oneness of what is seen by a single spectator or apprehended by a single mind."² The difference between

1. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 98.

2. Ibid., p. 99.

Practical Ethics without a Parent.

In taking up a criticism of Mr. Russell's ethics we direct attention first to the point where his practical ethics joins on to his philosophy. There is a weakness at this union of such a nature that it criticises is focused sharply upon it the point of connection will be dissolved, leaving his practical ethics suspended in mid air. His relative conclusions will have come into being without a parent. They will be seen to be less fortunate even than Athens, who sprang full-grown from the head of Zeus. To the task of showing this distinction between Mr. Russell's ethics and his philosophy we now turn our attention.

Philosophy for Mr. Russell is Eudaimon Generalised. It draws no conclusions beyond those which are warranted by the sciences. What I wish to bring to your notice is the possibility and importance of applying to philosophical problems certain broad principles of method which have been found successful in the study of scientific questions.¹

Mr. Russell rules out of philosophy the notion of the universe and the notions of good and evil. There is no such thing as a "universe" for "the apparent oneness of the world is merely the oneness of what is seen by a single spectator or apprehended by a single mind."² The difference between

1. Russell, *Principles and Limits*, p. 98.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

science and philosophy is the fact that the propositions of philosophy are more general, that is they are concerned, not with the whole of things collectively, but with all things distributively. This makes him an absolute pluralist. A second difference between science and philosophy is the fact that philosophic propositions are a priori. "A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical evidence."¹ philosophy becomes the "Science of the possible," or the general; it is indistinguishable from logic; and its essence is analysis rather than synthesis.²

Mr. Russell has no worries about metaphysical causality because he has no metaphysics. "Modern physics reduces matter to a set of events which proceed outward from a centre. If there is something further in the centre itself, we cannot know about it, and it is irrelevant to physics."³ Causality becomes "rules according to which events are connected," equations which "suffice to determine what happens in empty space and statistical averages as to what happens to matter. Whether there are laws, other than those of statistics, governing the behaviour of an individual atom in this respect, we do not know."⁴ "Causality does not involve compulsion, but only a law of sequence; if physical and mental events run parallel, either may with equal justice be regarded as causing the other,

1. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 111.

2. Ibid., pp. 112-13.

3. Russell, Philosophy, p. 157.

4. Ibid., p. 149.

science and philosophy is the fact that the propositions of philosophy are more general, that is they are concerned, not with the whole or things collectively, but with all things individually. This makes him an absolute idealist. A second difference between science and philosophy is the fact that philosophical propositions are a priori. "A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical evidence."¹ Philosophy becomes the science of the possible, or the general; it is indistinguishable from logic; and its essence is analysis rather than synthesis.²

Mr. Russell has no worries about metaphysical causality because he has no metaphysics. Modern physics reduces matter to a set of events which proceed outward from a centre. If there is something further in the centre itself, we cannot know about it, and it is irrelevant to physics.³ Causality becomes merely a method of connecting to which events are connected, and which results in determining what happens in every sense and statistical averages as to what happens to matter. Whether there are laws, other than those of statistics, governing the behaviour of an individual atom in this respect, we do not know.⁴ Causality does not involve causation, but only a law of sequence; it physical and mental events run parallel, either way with equal justice be regarded as causing the other.

1. Russell, Philosophy and Logic, p. 111.
2. Ibid., pp. 112-13.
3. Russell, Philosophy, p. 127.
4. Ibid., p. 142.

and there is no sense in speaking of them as causally independent."¹ "The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."² In the place of the notion of Cause he puts inductive probability, based on the observation of sequences which have hitherto operated consistently.³

The ultimate reality is a system of events. "Modern physics reduces matter to a set of events which proceed outward from a centre. If there is something further in the centre itself, we cannot know about it..."⁴ These events which constitute the nature of ultimate reality are essentially the same whether they combine to make physical objects or to make thoughts. The distinction between mind and matter is thus dissolved. "The traditional dualism of mind and matter...I regard as mistaken.... the distinction between mind and matter is illusory. The stuff of the world may be called physical or mental or both or neither, as we please; in fact, the words serve no purpose."⁵

Thus what we call mind is merely a collection of these events of which the stuff of the physical world is composed. It is "merely a cross-section in a stream of physical causation, and there is nothing odd about its being both an effect and a

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 238.

2. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 180.

3. Ibid., pp. 192-96.

4. Russell, Philosophy, p. 157.

5. Ibid., pp. 140-42.

and there is no sense in speaking of them as causally independent.¹ "The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."² In the place of the notion of cause he puts indeterminability, based on the observation of sequences which have historicity associated consistently.³

The ultimate reality is a system of events. "Modern physics teaches us that there is a set of events which proceed outward from a centre. If there is something further in the centre itself, we cannot know about it."⁴ These events which constitute the nature of ultimate reality are essentially the same whether they continue to make physical objects or to make thoughts. The distinction between mind and matter is thus dissolved. "The traditional dualism of mind and matter... is regarded as mistaken.... the distinction between mind and matter is illusory. The stuff of the world may be called physical or mental or both or neither, as we please; in fact, the world has no purpose."⁵

Thus what we call mind is merely a collection of these events of which the stuff of the physical world is composed. It is "merely a cross-section in a stream of physical causation, and there is nothing odd about its being both an effect and a

1. Russell, *Philosophy*, p. 128.
2. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 180.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.
4. Russell, *Philosophy*, p. 187.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-42.

cause in the physical world. Thus physical causal laws are those that are fundamental."¹

"Mental" events are those which occur in the region of a living brain. They have no constitutive or creative discreteness other than that which is characterized by the operation of physical laws on sensitive tissue. "Memory in some of its forms is, as we have seen, a consequence of the law of conditioned reflexes, which is at least as much physiological as psychological, and characterizes living tissue rather than mind. Knowledge, as we have found, is not easy to distinguish from sensitivity, which is a property possessed by scientific instruments."²

"Thus 'mind' and 'mental' are merely approximate concepts, giving a convenient shorthand for certain approximate laws. In a completed science, the word 'mind' and the word 'matter' would both disappear, and would be replaced by causal laws concerning 'events'.... It will be seen that the view which I am advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what we call 'neutral monism'. It is monism in the sense that it regards the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events; but it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal event being a logically self-subsistent entity."³

A view which reduces matter and mind to logical relations dispenses, from the standpoint of consistency, with any unity

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 150.

2. Ibid., p. 280.

3. Ibid., pp. 281-282.

stances in the physical world. Thus physical causal laws are those that are fundamental.¹

"Mental" events are those which occur in the region of a living brain. They have no constitutive or creative character other than that which is characterized by the operation of physical laws on sensitive tissue. Memory in some of its forms is, as we have seen, a consequence of the law of conditioned reflexes, which is at least as much physiological as psychological, and characterizes living tissue rather than mind. Knowledge, as we have found, is not easy to distinguish from sensitivity, which is a property possessed by sensitive instruments.² "Thus mind and mental are merely approximate concepts, giving a convenient shorthand for certain approximate laws in a restricted science, the work of mind and the work of matter would both disappear, and would be replaced by causal laws concerning events.... It will be seen that the view which is advanced is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what we call 'neutral monism'. It is neutral in the sense that it regards the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events; but it is dualistic in the sense that it admits the existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal event being a logically self-subsistent entity."³

A view which reduces matter and mind to logical relations disappears, from the standpoint of consistency, with any unity

1. Russell, *Philosophy*, p. 180.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

or autonomy in mind or consciousness. The admission of only one kind of stuff in the world makes thought the outgrowth of things and consciousness a function. Mr. Russell is aware of this; his conclusion is that there are "thoughts" which perform the function of "knowing" and that "thoughts are not made from any different stuff from that of material objects."¹ "Those events are classed as 'mental' which are characterized by the combination of sensitivity with associative reproduction. The more markedly this combination exists, the more 'mental' are the events concerned; thus mentality is a matter of degree."² A mental event may be further defined as one that "can be known with the highest degree of certainty, because in physical space-time, the event and the knowing of it are contiguous. Thus 'mental' events will be certain of the events that occur in heads that have brains. These will not be all events that occur in brains, but only such as cause a reaction of the kind that can be called 'knowledge.'³ The total effect of this point of view is the putting of the razor to such notions as the Self with its unity and constitutive activity. A selective, organizing, unifying knower is not essential to knowledge, for knowledge is the effect produced by "events that occur."

If we were answering Mr. Russell's philosophy we should point out that without the activity of such a knower it would have been impossible for him to reach such a conclusion, for

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 214.

2. Ibid..

3. Ibid., p. 215.

or autonomy in mind or consciousness. The admission of only one kind of stuff in the world makes thought the outgrowth of things and consciousness a function. Mr. Russell is aware of this; his conclusion is that there are "thoughts" which perform the function of "knowing" and that "thoughts are not made from any different stuff from that of material objects."¹ "Thoughts are classed as 'mental,' which are characterized by the combination of sensitivity with associative reproduction. The more markedly this combination exists, the more 'mental' are the events concerned; thus mentality is a matter of degree."² A mental event may be further defined as one that "can be known with the highest degree of certainty," because in physical events, the event and the knowing of it are continuous. Then 'mental' events will be certain of the events that occur in heads that have brains. These will not be all events that occur in brains, but only such as cause a reaction of the kind that can be called 'knowledge.'³ The total effect of this point of view is the cutting of the razor to such notions as the Self with its unity and constitutive activity. A selective, organizing, uniting knower is not essential to knowledge, for knowledge is the effect produced by "events that occur." If we were answering Mr. Russell's philosophy we should point out that without the activity of such a knower it would have been impossible for him to reach such a conclusion, for

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 214.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 215.

events do not organize themselves into knowledge. We should point out that the activity of the Self is evident even in simple perception. These enticements are alluring but they lie outside our present purpose. Our task lies in showing that Mr. Russell is not, on the basis of his philosophy, permitted to use the concept Self in his thinking and further, he is not permitted to appeal to any unifying, selective, organizing faculty, for this is what we mean by the Self.

Our next task is to show that he does not conduct himself consistently in the light of these limitations. He drives the Self out the back door but smuggles it in thru the window while the reader is unaware. He devotes some attention to this particular complication and it will be instructive, from the point of view of uncovering a basic confusion, to note this treatment.

We must realize at the outset that on the question of the existence of the Self, even when he faces the issue squarely, Mr. Russell is vacillating. His point of view is not the same in his Philosophy as in his Problems of Philosophy. In the latter he points out¹ that it is difficult to explain how we have knowledge of a sense datum unless we assume that we are "acquainted with something which we call 'I'". It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, the same today as yesterday, but it does seem as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature,

1. p. 80. *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 80.
Philosophy, p. 240.
Philosophy, p. 153.

events do not organize themselves into knowledge. We should

point out that the activity of the Self is evident even in

single perception. These antecedents are affecting but they are

outside our present process. Our task lies in showing that Mr.

Russell is not, on the basis of his philosophy, committed to use

the concept Self in his thinking and further, he is not committed

to appeal to any unifying, selective, organizing activity, for

this is what we mean by the Self.

Our next task is to show that he does not condemn himself

consistently in the light of these limitations. He drives the

Self out the back door but smuggles it in turn the window while

the reader is unaware. He devotes some attention to this car-

ricular consideration and it will be ineffective, from the point

of view of unifying a basic position, to note this treatment.

We must realize at the outset that on the question of the

existence of the Self, even when he faces the issue squarely,

Mr. Russell is evasive. His point of view is not the same

in his philosophy as in his problems of philosophy. In the latter

he points out that it is difficult to explain how we have

knowledge of a sense datum unless we assume that we are "acquainted

with something which we call 'it'. It does not seem necessary

to suppose that we are acquainted with a word or face perceived

person, the same today as yesterday, but it does seem as though

we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature.

which sees the sun/¹ (to take a single example), and has acquaintance with sense-data. Thus, in some sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as apposed to our particular experiences. But arguments can be adduced on both sides," and though it is probable "it is not wise to assert that it undoubtedly does occur."¹ In the "problems" his mind is open on the question and he entertains a strong possibility in favor a Self of which we have immediate knowledge.

However, after some fifteen years of meditation on the subject his attitude becomes more confidently negative; "I" becomes "only a string of events each of which separately is more certain than the whole."² He criticises Descartes for making a false assumption, namely, that thoughts imply a thinker, and questions; "But why should they? Why should not a thinker be simply a certain series of thoughts, connected with each other by causal laws?...When we say, 'I think first this and then that,' we ought not to mean that there is a single entity 'I' which has two successive thoughts. We ought to mean only that there are two successive thoughts which have causal relations of the kind that makes us call them parts of one biography, in the same sort of way in which successive notes may be parts of one tune..."³ He seems to be very certain in his later thinking that the possibility which he entertained at an earlier date is foreclosed, possibly due to advances in psychology. He says:

1. Russell, problems of philosophy, p. 80.

2. Russell, philosophy, p. 240.

3. ibid., p. 163.

which sees the same (to take a single example) and has acquainted-
 ants with sense-data. Thus, in some sense it would seem we
 must be acquainted with our Selves as occurred to our particular
 experiences. But arguments can be adduced on both sides," and
 though it is probable "it is not wise to assert that it undoubt-
 edly does occur." In the "proposition" his mind is open on the
 question and he entertains a strong possibility in favor of a Self
 of which we have immediate knowledge.

However, after some fifteen years of meditation on the
 subject his attitude becomes more confidently negative. "It
 becomes" only a string of events each of which separately is
 more certain than the whole.² He criticizes Descartes for
 making a false assumption, namely, that thoughts imply a thinker,
 and questions, "but why should they? Why should not a thinker
 be simply a certain series of thoughts, connected with each
 other by causal links... When we say, 'I think that this and that
 that,' we ought not to mean that there is a single entity 'I'
 which has two successive thoughts. We ought to mean only that
 there are two successive thoughts which have causal relations
 of the kind that makes us call them parts of one history. In
 the same sort of way in which successive notes may be parts of
 one tune..." He seems to be very certain in his later think-
 ing that the possibility which he entertained at an earlier date
 is foreclosed, namely the to advance in psychology. He says:

1. Russell, Principles of Philosophy, p. 80.
 2. Russell, Philosophy, p. 240.
 3. Ibid., p. 133.

"In psychology equally (as matter in physics) the 'ego' has disappeared as an ultimate conception, and the unity of a personality has become a peculiar causal nexus among a series of events....And it must be understood that the same reasons which lead to the rejection of substance lead also to the rejection of 'things' and 'persons' as ultimately valid concepts."¹

Hume was almost certainly right. A person is not a single entity, but a series of events linked together by peculiar causal laws."²

Again we are almost tempted to point out that Russell, like Hume, saws off the bough on which he sits when he dispenses with the Self, for one cannot say "When I look within I find only mental states" without involving the Self in the judgment. The existence of the Self is the precondition of the judgment; it is the I. So Russell in criticising Descartes says he ought to say that "He finds doubt going on,"³ (Italics mine) but the existence of "he" betrays the presence of the Self. This, then, is the difficulty, that while Mr. Russell dissolves the Self into events and denies its existence he is forced to use it in his thinking.

The necessity of using this concept is evident when he comes to discussing mind. He points out that it is certain that "there are groups (of mental events) having that kind of unity that makes us call them one mind. There are two marked

1. Russell, philosophy, p. 243.

2. Ibid., p. 247.

3. Ibid., p. 163.

"In psychology equally (as Water in physics) the 'ego' has disappeared as an ultimate conception, and the unity of a personality has become a peculiar causal nexus among a series of events.... And it must be understood that the same reasons which lead to the rejection of substance lead also to the rejection of 'things' and 'persons' as ultimately valid concepts."¹

Hume was almost certainly right. A person is not a single entity, but a series of events linked together by peculiar causal laws."²

Again we are almost tempted to point out that Russell, like Hume, saw all the power on which he sits when he discusses with the Self, for one cannot say "When I look within I find only mental states" without involving the Self in the judgment. The existence of the Self is the precondition of the judgment: it is the I. So Russell in criticizing Descartes says he ought to say that "he finds doubt going on,"³ (realizing mine) but the existence of "he" betrays the presence of the Self. This, then, is the difficulty, that while Mr. Russell dissolves the Self into events and denies its existence he is forced to use it in his thinking.

The necessity of using this concept is evident when he comes to discussing mind. We point out that it is certain that there are things (or mental events) having that kind of unity that makes us call them one mind. There are two marked

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 243.
2. Ibid., p. 247.
3. Ibid., p. 163.

characteristics of a mind; first, it is connected with a certain body; secondly, it has the unity of one 'experience.'"¹ (*Italics mine*).

Further use of the concept Self is abundantly evident in his ethical writings. He tells us that that person is the brightest prospect for happiness who is motivated by a single purpose. "Continuity of purpose is one of the most essential ingredients of happiness in the long run."² Happiness comes more easily to those who "regard their lives as a whole...since they will gradually build up those circumstances from which they can derive contentment and self-respect, whereas the others will be blown about by the winds of circumstance now this way, now that, without ever arriving at any haven."³ Mr. Russell warns us that constructive purposes are not born with us. They are a matter of, shall we say, achievement: "But constructive purposes do not easily form themselves in a boy's mind if he is living a life of distractions and dissipations, for in that case his thoughts will always be directed towards the next pleasure rather than towards the distant achievement."⁴

Speaking of happiness as an achievement is not a false reading of Mr. Russell since his own opinion is that "happiness must be for most men and women, an achievement rather than a gift of the gods, and in this achievement effort, both inward and outward, must play a great part."⁵ It may be remembered

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 286.

2. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, p. 211.

3. Ibid., p. 219.

4. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

5. Ibid., p. 232.

characteristic of a mind, itself, it is connected with a certain body; secondly, it has the quality of one, exemplified in I (Hellas mine).

Further use of the concept of self is abundantly evident in his official writings. He tells us that that person is the brightest prospect for happiness who is motivated by a single purpose. "Motivation of purpose is one of the most essential ingredients of happiness in the long run."² Happiness comes more easily to those who regard their lives as a whole... since they will gradually build up those circumstances from which they can derive contentment and self-interest, whereas the others will be blown about by the winds of circumstance now this way, now that, without ever arriving at any haven."³ Mr. Russell warns us that destructive purposes are not born with us. They are a matter of, shall we say, achievement. "But constructive purposes do not easily come themselves in a boy's mind if he is living a life of distractions and dissipation, for in that case his thoughts will always be directed towards the next pleasure rather than towards the distant achievement."⁴

Speaking of happiness as an achievement is not a false reading of Mr. Russell since his own opinion is that "happiness must be for most men and women, an achievement rather than a gift or the force, and in this achievement effort, both inward and outward, must play a great part."⁵ It may be remembered

1. Russell, *Philosophy*, p. 286.
2. Russell, *The Concept of Happiness*, p. 211.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

that he entitles his book the Conquest of Happiness.

We might go further and say that this achieving of happiness is for Mr. Russell a selective process. He points out that "the practical need of morals arises from the conflict of desires, whether of different people or of the same person at different times or at one time."¹ The solution of this conflict involves a process of selection. Furthermore, he rules out certain desires such as drunkenness because they are not the expression of an "integrated" person; they represent the abrogation of "the painful necessity of thought." That happiness is a selective process is further illustrated by the fact that it depends, as we noted, upon "constructive purposes" and these do not "form themselves". Happiness is now beginning to take on a rather complex appearance, just how complex it is Mr. Russell tells us: "all unhappiness depends upon some kind of disintegration or lack of integration; there is disintegration within the self through lack of coordination between the conscious and the unconscious mind; there is lack of integration between the self and society....The happy man is the man who does not suffer from either of these failures of unity..."²

This making of happiness a selective process depending upon "constructive purposes" which are the manifestation of an "integration" within the "self" is a very interesting conclusion to draw from the premise that the Self is a "string of events".

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 35.

2. Russell, Conquest of Happiness, pp. 248-49.

that he entitled his book The Goodness of Happiness.

We might go further and say that this meaning of happiness is for Mr. Russell a relative process. He points out that "the practical need of people arises from the conflict of desires, whether of different people or of the same person at different times or at one time."¹ The solution of this conflict involves a process of selection. Furthermore, he rules out certain desires such as drunkenness because they are not the expression of an "interested" person; they represent the absorption in "the painful necessity of thought." That happiness is a relative process is further illustrated by the fact that it depends, as we noted, upon "constructive purposes" and these as not "from themselves". Happiness is now beginning to take on a rather complex appearance; just how complex it is Mr. Russell tells us, "if unhappiness depends upon some kind of disintegration or lack of integration; there is disintegration within the self through lack of coordination between the conscious and the unconscious mind; there is lack of integration between the self and society.... The happy man is the man who does not suffer from either of these failures of unity...."²

This making of happiness a relative process depending upon "constructive purposes" which are the solution of an "integration" within the "self" is a very interesting position to draw from the premise that the self is a "thing of events".

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 85.
2. Russell, Goodness of Happiness, pp. 248-49.

The good life is made to depend upon a Self which does not exist. This is the fundamental inconsistency. The good life which Mr. Russell elaborates so admirably in his ethics depends for its realization upon an entity or agency, the existence of which he denies in his philosophy. Thus ethics is left without a parent; the matrix upon which ethics depends for its life is dissolved away. If consistency of thought means anything to a philosopher (and Mr. Russell is zealous in his support of it) it follows that at this point, where his ethics joins his philosophy, there is a flaw which is the undoing of his system. The trouble is in regard to his ethics, not that ~~they~~ ^{it} ~~are~~ ^{is} not praiseworthy, but that ~~they~~ ^{it} stands in direct contradiction to his philosophy, an error which a careful thinker should be anxious to avoid.

There is besides this contradiction, which is fundamental and deadly, a further confusion in regard to Mr. Russell's use (or rather abuse) of the hedonistic point of view. We have noted that he professes to write as a hedonist.¹ The standard of good is desire; "outside human desires there is no moral standard."² Anything is good provided it is desired. "A single desire is no better and no worse, considered in isolation, than any other."³ Morality arises from the fact that there is conflict among desires either in the individual himself or between the desires of the individual and society. Consequently,

1. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness, p. 247.

2. Russell, What I Believe, p. 32.

3. Ibid., p. 84.

the moral task becomes the establishing of harmony among the desires and the summum bonum the achieving of maximum satisfaction for desire. "The supreme moral rule should, therefore, be, Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires."¹ The achieving of harmonious desire, or happiness, is the good.

We confess that this does have a hedonistic tang about it and that arguing for happiness as the greatest good is orthodox hedonism, but the question in our mind is, How can one be a consistent hedonist and still contend for a distinction in pleasures. The choice of one pleasure as over against another presupposes a standard of judgment which is not pleasure but something else other than pleasure. Poetry becomes better than pushpin only when the Self which appreciates poetry is given a higher rating than the one which appreciates pushpin only, and when this position is taken pleasures are no longer good in themselves but good in relation to a Self. The Self, not pleasure, becomes the greatest good.

This has ever been the fault with hedonism. Epicurus is always becoming better than his philosophy and introducing distinctions to which he is not logically entitled. Mr Russell is victim of this fallacy. He starts out by saying that one desire is as good as another and finishes by advocating control of the passionate desires and advocating through education the cultivation of the desire for knowledge, because, supposedly,

1. Russell, philosophy, p. 234.

it carries more profound satisfactions. "Intellectual curiosity, for example affords a mild diffused satisfaction, whereas drugs provide ecstasy followed by despair."¹

While writing as a hedonist he looks to the Reason for guidance in distinguishing between desires; "The hatred of reason, " he says, "which is common in our time is very largely due to the fact that the operations of reason are not conceived in a sufficiently fundamental way. The man divided against himself looks for excitement and distraction; he loves strong passions, not for sound reasons, but because for the moment they take him outside himself and prevent the painful necessity of thought. Any passion is to him a form of intoxication, and since he cannot conceive of fundamental happiness (Italics mine) all relief from pain appears to him solely possible in the form of intoxication. This, however, is the symptom of a deep-seated malady. Where there is no such malady the greatest happiness comes with the most complete possession of one's faculties."² It is on this ground that he dismisses the desires for excess in drink and drugs, and while we admire the conclusion we marvel that he is able to draw it--as a hedonist. Perhaps the inconsistency is additional testimony to the superior merit of the conclusion, since he is willing to hazard it against such odds.

The criticism here is essentially the same as the one preceding, namely, that Mr. Russell transcends his premises in

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 231.

2. Russell, Conquest of Happiness, p. 109.

it carries more profound satisfaction. "Intellectual curiosity, for example affords a mild diluted satisfaction, whereas drugs provide ecstasy followed by despair."

While writing as a hedonist he looks to the Master for guidance in distinguishing between desire, "the naked of reason."

he says, "which is common in our time is very largely due to the

fact that the operations of reason are not conceived in a

scientifically fundamental way. The man divided against himself

looks for excitement and distraction; he leaves serious passions,

not for sound reasons, but because for the moment they take him

outside himself and prevent the painful necessity of thought.

Any passion is to him a form of intoxication, and since he

cannot tolerate of fundamental passions (it is his mind) all

relief from pain appears to him solely possible in the form of

intoxication. This, however, is the symptom of a deep-seated

malady. Where there is no such malady the greatest happiness

comes with the most complete possession of one's faculties."

It is on this ground that he dismisses the desire for excess

in drink and drugs, and while we admit the conclusion we marvel

that he is able to draw it--as a hedonist. Perhaps the inco-

herence is additional testimony to the superior merit of the

conclusion, since he is willing to hazard it against such odds.

The criticism here is essentially the same as the one

previously, namely, that Mr. Russell transcends his position in

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 231.
2. Russell, Principles of Philosophy, p. 102.

drawing his conclusions, which is more of a tribute to Mr. Russell than to his philosophy.

A final criticism of Mr. Russell is the fact that the consequence of his theoretical ethics is subjectivity. He admits this freely: "I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many as possible will agree."¹ There is no compulsion in a judgment of oughtness because there is no such thing as "knowledge" in ethics. "I do not think there is, strictly speaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge. If we desire to achieve some end, knowledge may show us the means, and this knowledge may loosely pass as ethical. But I do not believe that we can decide what sort of conduct is right or wrong except by reference to its probable consequences."² The ends we pursue are not decided by reason; they are given in desire.

Desire is the basis of ethics and taken separately one desire is as good as another. The only distinction between desires is the fact that some tend to produce harmony while others foster discord. In a larger sense, therefore, we may term a desire "good" if it tends to encourage harmony for in harmony there is the largest realization for desire.³

This makes ethics entirely personal and subjective. Truth in ethics is what the individual or his group wishes or desires,

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 29.

2. Ibid.

3. Russell, Philosophy, p. 234.

drawing his conclusions, which is more of a tribute to Mr.

Russell than to his philosophy.

A final criticism of Mr. Russell is the fact that the

consequence of his theoretical ethics is negativity. He

admits this freely: "I cannot, therefore, prove that my view

of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope

that as many as possible will agree."¹ There is no consolation

in a judgment of oughtness because there is no such thing as

"knowledge" in ethics. "I do not think there is, strictly

speaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge. If we desire

to achieve some end, knowledge may show us the means, and this

knowledge may possibly cause an ethical. But I do not believe

that we can decide what sort of conduct is right or wrong except

by reference to its probable consequences."² The ends we pursue

are not decided by reason; they are given in desire.

Desire is the basis of ethics and taken separately one

desire is as good as another. The only distinction between

desires is the fact that some tend to produce harmony while

others foster discord. In a larger sense, therefore, we may

form a desire "good" if it tends to encourage harmony for in

harmony there is the largest realization for desire.³

This makes ethics entirely personal and subjective. Truth

in ethics is what the individual or his group wishes or desires.

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 29.

2. Ibid.

3. Russell, Philosophy, p. 234.

There is no moral judgment which is objectively valid and binding upon all reasonable individuals.

Mr. Russell did not always hold this view. He formerly believed that "good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right."¹

There is still a glimmer of this objectivity in his essay, "A Free Man's Worship."² Here he admits that good and evil have no objective basis in the world of nature. The objective world takes no cognizance of man's desires and offers no support for his values. These values are the product of causes "which had no prevision of the end they were achieving." Nature is in no way interested in man's hopes, fears, or ideals and in the end all these will perish beneath the "debris of a universe in ruins." But in the face of this Mr. Russell turns to the worship of ideals. Man "with his knowledge of good and evil" must tame his desires and burn with "passion for eternal things." These eternal things are man's ideals. Man worships "at the shrine that his own hands have built." The temple of man's worship is built in the land of the imagination; it is made of "music...architecture...and the golden sunset magic of lyrics"; it encompasses the kingdom of reason. He seems to imply in this essay that this temple

1. Quoted by George Santayana, Winds of Doctrine, pp.140-41.

2. Mysticism and Logic, third essay.

There is no moral judgment which is objectively valid and binding upon all reasonable individuals.

Mr. Russell did not always hold this view. He formerly believed that "good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions. Just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right."

There is still a fragment of this objectivity in his essay, "A free man's worship."² Here he admits that good and evil have no objective basis in the world of nature. The objective world takes no cognizance of man's desires and offers no support for his values. These values are the product of causes which had no provision of the end and they were arbitrary. "Nature is in no way interested in man's hopes, fears, or ideals and in the end all these will perish beneath the 'dubious' of a universe in ruins." But in the face of this Mr. Russell turns to the worship of ideals. Man "with his knowledge of good and evil must take his desires and burn with 'passion for eternal things.' These eternal things are man's ideals. Man worships 'at the shrine that his own hands have built.' The temple of man's worship is built in the land of the imagination; it is made of 'visions...architectures...and the golden sunset eagle of lyricism'; it encompasses the kingdom of reason. He seems to imply in this essay that this temple

1. Quoted by George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*, pp. 140-41.
2. *Epistolarum et Logicae*, third essay.

of worship is, or ought to be, the shrine of civilized man everywhere and that although it has only a human validity it is valid for all humans.

This implication is doubtless the betrayal of his desire to attach some weight to the things which he finds valuable, but criticism has forced him to retreat from this desire and to surrender the modicum of objectivity which is implied here. He later (1917) writes, "In theoretical Ethics, the position advocated in 'The Free Man's Worship' is not quite identical with that which I hold now; I feel less convinced than I did then (1902) of the objectivity of good and evil."¹ or again he says, "There is a view, advocated e.g. by Dr. G.E. Moore, that 'good' is an indefinable notion, and that we know a priori certain general propositions about the kinds of things that are good on their own account. Such things as happiness, knowledge, appreciation of beauty are known to be good, according to Dr. Moore; it is also known that we ought to act so as to create what is good and prevent what is bad. I formerly held this view myself, but I was led to abandon it, partly by Mr. Santayana's Winds of Doctrine. I now think that good and bad are derivative from desire."² (1927) We may conclude, therefore, that his final position is that of complete subjectivity in ethics.

The consequence of this subjectivity, aside from the fact

1. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, preface, p. v.

2. Russell, Philosophy, p. 230.

of worship is, or ought to be, the shrine of civilized man everywhere and that although it has only a human validity it is valid for all humans.

This implication is doubtless the betrayal of his desire to attach some weight to the things which he finds valuable, but criticism has forced him to retreat from this desire and to surrender the notions of objectivity which he implied here. He later (1917) writes: "In theoretical Ethics, the position advocated in 'The Free Man's Worship' is not quite identical with that which I hold now; I feel less convinced than I did then (1902) of the objectivity of good and evil."¹ or again he says, "There is a view, advocated e.g. by Dr. C.S. Moore, that 'good' is an indefinable notion, and that we know a priori certain general propositions about the kinds of things that are good on their own account. Such things as happiness, knowledge, recreation of beauty are known to be good, according to Dr. Moore; it is also known that we ought to act so as to create what is good and prevent what is bad. I formerly held this view myself, but I was led to abandon it, partly by Mr. Santayana's Winds of Doctrine. I now think that good and bad are derivative from desire."² (1927) We may conclude, therefore, that his final position is that of complete subjectivity in ethics.

The consequences of this subjectivity, aside from the fact

1. Russell, Writings and Lectures, volume 7, p. 230.
2. Russell, Philosophy, p. 230.

that the corollary of it is nescience in science, which Mr. Russell would not accept, is the destructive effect it has upon the relation between his theoretical and his practical ethics. Given no more than he provides in his theoretical ethics it is difficult to see how we ever rose above the ethic of barbarism. We can understand how one who has, through control and self-cultivation, achieved the "love" level of life would not be tempted to exchange his system of values for those at the level of unbridled passion. But how can we logically ever achieve the love level if we are convinced that, taken separately, one desire is as good as another and all are purely subjective? What motive is there for control or achievement? How do we ever come by the knowledge that love is better than hate?

So long as good desires have been achieved, having been created by the use of another logic, Mr. Russell's theories will justify them, but his theories of themselves have nothing in them to inspire the cultivation of good desires, for any desire is good provided it does not interfere with other desires either in the individual or the group. He says "If we arrive unexpectedly in Robinson Crusoe's island and find him studying botany, we shall think better of him than if we find him dead drunk on his last bottle of whiskey."¹ But why should we? He would not be interfering with the desires of any one else and he could easily be conceived as having no desire whatever to study botany. Why

1. Russell, philosophy, p. 231.

that the superiority of it is manifest in science, which Mr. Russell would not accept, is the decisive effect it has upon the relation between his theoretical and his practical ethics. Given no more than he provides in his theoretical ethics it is difficult to see how we ever rise above the ethic of barbarism. We can understand how one who has, through control and cultivation, achieved the "love" level of life would not be tempted to exchange his system of values for those at the level of unbridled passion. But how can we logically ever achieve the love level if we are convinced that, taken absolutely, one desire is as good as another and all are purely subjective? What motive is there for control or achievement? How do we ever come by the knowledge that love is better than hate? So long as good desires have been achieved, having been created by the use of another logic, Mr. Russell's theories will justify them, but his theories of themselves have nothing to them to inspire the cultivation of good desires, for any desire is good provided it does not interfere with other desires either in the individual or the group. He says "If we arrive unhesitatingly in Robinson Crusoe's island and find his studying botany, we shall think better of him than if we find him dead drunk on his last bottle of whiskey."¹ But why should we? He would not be interfering with the desires of any one else and he could easily be conceived as having no desire whatever to study botany. Why

1. Russell, Philosophy, p. 231.

then should we think it better if he studied botany? Intrinsically studying botany is no better than getting drunk, in fact, it is not as good as getting drunk if one does not desire it. The situation cannot be relieved by appealing to the judgment that he "ought to prefer to study botany" because, as Mr. Russell admits, on the basis of his principles, "ought" is "merely what someone else wishes us to desire."¹ Further, "it seems not possible to judge whether anything is intrinsically valuable unless we have experienced something of the same kind."²

With no more ethical equipment than this we could never have risen above the ethics of barbarism, and the only reasons that could be given a civilized man to dissuade him from barbarous passions is the fact that the majority might vote against him. This is the whole truth if we assume that the individual has no other desires to conflict with the barbarous passions, an assumption which is rendered not at all difficult by some observations. This being the case, Mr. Russell's principles force us logically to pronounce these passions "good."

But here again Mr. Russell proves better than his philosophy. He maintains the primacy of love as against hate, and for reason as against passion. He contends that "It is impossible to cause a man to do right things consistently unless he has the right desires. And the right desires cannot be produced merely by praising them or desiring to have them."³ (*Italics mine*).

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 29.

2. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 118.

3. Ibid., p. 234.

then should we think it better to be studied holism? Intrinsically
 studying holism is no better than getting drunk, in fact, it is
 not as good as getting drunk if one does not desire it. The
 situation cannot be relieved by appealing to the judgment that
 he "ought to prefer to study holism" because, as Mr. Russell
 admits, on the basis of his principles, "ought" is "merely what
 someone else wishes us to desire."¹ Further, "it seems not
 possible to judge whether anything is intrinsically valuable un-
 less we have experienced something of the same kind."²
 With no more ethical equipment than this we could never
 have risen above the status of barbarism, and the only reason
 that could be given a civilized man to dissuade him from barbarism
 is the fact that the majority might vote against him.
 This is the whole truth it we assume that the individual has no
 other desires to conflict with the barbarous passions, an assumption
 which is rendered not at all difficult by some observations.
 This being the case, Mr. Russell's principles force us logically
 to pronounce these passions "good."
 But here again Mr. Russell proves better than his philosophy.
 He maintains the primacy of love as against hate, and for reason
 as against passion. He contends that "it is impossible to cause
 a man to do right things consistently unless he has the right
 desires. And the right desires cannot be produced merely by
 praising them or desiring to have them."³ (Italics mine).

1. Russell, What I Believe, p. 29.
 2. Russell, Principles of Philosophy, p. 118.
 3. Ibid., p. 231.

He speaks of "standards of rectitude."¹ All these things may be true, but he holds these truths in contradiction to his basic theories. He has no right to talk of "right" desires when his theory commits him to subjectivity. The most that he is entitled to is his "opinion" of what is right. He speaks of changing desires thru education² but to justify this, one would have to appeal to a standard of goodness other than desire, else why talk of modifying desire? If we apply consistently the principles of Mr. Russell's theoretical ethics to a Robinson Crusoe who has no interest in botany we should have to conclude that it is good to find him "dead drunk on his last bottle of whiskey." And further if we stay by our theoretical guns we shall have to say that we are not entitled to entertain the possibility of changing his desires, since to do so would imply that our desires, which we would be recommending to him, are true and his false, and this conclusion cannot be consistently drawn from the premises which define the good in terms of any desires which do not produce conflict.

But Mr. Russell does not, in his practical ethics, draw the bitter conclusion of his theoretical ethics. In writing ethical maxims and ideals he transcends his theoretical ethics, and the weakness is that he does this at the expense of consistency.

In conclusion, we may summarize our study as follows,

-
1. Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 311.
 2. Russell, Philosophy, p. 233.

A study of Mr. Russell's practical ethics as revealed in reforms in education, politics, marriage, and personal conduct leads us to approve and accept his basic principles, and to believe that these can be defended against the superficial criticisms usually waged against them. However, a study of the relation of his practical ethics to his philosophy and to his theoretical ethics reveals weaknesses and confusion at three points; (1) his philosophical position forbids his using the concept Self, but he uses this concept surreptitiously in his discussion of mind and in his practical ethics; (2) he professes to write as a hedonist but transcends hedonism by making a distinction between desires; (3) the consequence of his theoretical ethics is ethical subjectivity, but he avoids this consequence in practice when he speaks of "standards of rectitude" and "right" desires.

In a word, our conclusion is that Mr. Russell himself is the best refutation of his philosophy, for he consistently proves himself better than his philosophy permits him to be.

1917, pp. 245-25.

1912, pp. 1-100.

1918, pp. viii-212.

1927, pp. 12-175.

1922, pp. 13-249.

The pages noted are the pages studied.

Bibliography*

"Bertrand Russell's plea for the Child as the vital factor in Modern Education." Current Opinion, July, 1916, pp. 46-47.

Bruce, William Cabell. "A Criticism of Bertrand Russell's New Morality." Current History, March, 1930, pp. 1105-1108.

Glendening, Dr. Logan. "Sex Madness." Forum, October, 1930, pp. 208-212.

"Organum Novissimum." Nation, Jan. 21, 1915, pp. 83-84. Review.

Perry, Ralph Barton. "The Philosophy of Mr. Russell." Nation, Feb. 18, 1915, pp. 196-197.

Russell, Bertrand. Education and the Good Life. New York, Boni and Liveright, 1926, pp. 7-236.

"For Conscience Sake." Independent, Jan. 15, 1917, pp. 101-102.

Marriage and Morals. New York, Horace Liveright, 1929, pp. 3-320.

Mysticism and Logic. New York, Longmans Green, and Co., 1918, pp. 1-33; 46-125; 180-232. Reference is made in this paper to the following essays:

"A Free Man's Worship," 1902.

"On the Notion of Cause," 1912.

"Scientific Method in philosophy," 1914.

philosophy. New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1927, pp. 1-301.

"Political Ideals." North American Review, Feb., 1917, pp. 248-59.

Problems of Philosophy. New York, Henry Holt, 1912, pp. 9-250.

Proposed Roads to Freedom. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1919, pp. vii-212.

Selected papers. New York, Modern Library, 1927, pp. ix-193.

The Conquest of Happiness. New York, Horace Liveright, 1930, pp. 13-249.

*The pages noted are the pages studied.

Bibliography (continued).

Russell, Bertrand. What I Believe. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925, pp. v--87.

Charles Boni, 1930, pp. 42--79. Why Men Fight. New York: Albert and

Santayana, G. Winds of Doctrine. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926, pp. 110--155.

Warrick, Mrs. Walter D. "Farewell to Sophistication." Harpers, Oct., 1930, pp. 546-52.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY



1 1719 02573 0534

